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This paper will address whether it is possible for an economy, planned by experts, to
result in greater economic good than can be achieved by spontaneous order created by the
combination of individual choices that make up the free market? This paper approaches the
question by studying the viability of economic forecasting because planning an economy
requires making economic forecasts. There are at least three domains that impact forecasting: the
nature of forecasting and modeling in general in a chaotic environment, the effect of asset
bubbles, and the impact of black swan events. There is a great deal of research focused on
modeling and forecasting in general and in the economy specifically. There is also substantial
research dealing with the growth and collapse of asset bubbles. There is very little research
investigating black swan events.
A lack of an overarching synthesis that shows how these three domains tie together
represents a significant gap in the research. Merging the research on models and forecasting with
research on government economic interventions and past economic disasters resulting from
bubbles and the failure of governments to predict and respond to them will help close this gap.
This synthesis will demonstrate the impossibility of economic forecasting. It will show that since
forecasting is impossible, then planning is also impossible. It will propose a research-supported
role of government in the economic sector and an appropriate government action designed to
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eliminate asset bubbles by directly addressing rent-seeking, the desire to make a quick profit
without adding any value. It is this rent-seeking that creates the bubbles.
Demonstrating that central economic planning can never provide more significant
economic benefits than the free market and what actions the government might take instead will
also help fill the gap in the research mentioned earlier. Narrowing this gap in the research will be
of great value to those evaluating the differences between the free market and planned
economies.
KEYWORDS: centrally planned economy, free markets, forecasting, modeling, chaos
theory, asset bubbles, black swans
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The United States is at a crossroads. Public pressure from some quarters to move the
United States government toward socialism is increasingly influencing public policy. While
many proposals are closer to fascism than socialism, the difference is hardly significant given
that both systems require the government to plan and control the economy and diminish or
eliminate the free market. One of the requirements for effective government planning of the
economy is its ability to make accurate economic forecasts, and the goal of this dissertation is to
determine the extent to which that accurate forecasting is possible.
The answer to this question is crucial as it may decide the economic direction of the
United States for the rest of this century and beyond. Accordingly, both policymakers and the
public need to know which direction will benefit the greater economic good. There are three
possible directions at this crossroads - left, right, and straight ahead. The road left leads to a
centrally planned economy (CPE); the road right leads to a renewal of the free market and a
reduction in the attempts of the government to control that market. Finally, the road straight
ahead leads to continued indecisive actions and cobbled together policies that attempt to
compromise the conflict of visions between those who wish to turn left and those who wish to
turn right. Unfortunately, this conflict has proven to be increasingly divisive, and answering this
question may lead to a reversal of that trend (Newport and Dugan, 2017).
Newport and Dugan (2017) report polling data conducted by the Gallup organization, and
their findings indicate increasing divisiveness. Figure 1 below shows an increase in the
divisiveness of forty-four percent regarding the size of the federal government in the past
fourteen years.
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Figure 2 indicates that divisiveness on the degree to which the government should be responsible
for healthcare has increased twenty-three percent in fifteen years.
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Finally, Figure 3 shows that the belief that “upper income” people pay too little taxes has
increased in its divisiveness by thirteen percent in fourteen years. Answering which path leads to
the greater economic good may mitigate or reverse this increasing divisiveness.
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Even if divisiveness were not an issue, the question is still important in its own right. We
are at the crossroads now, and if policymakers and the public do not have complete and accurate
information about which path is most likely to lead to the outcome they desire, the results may be
disastrous. The purpose of this research was not to investigate whether a CPE is moral or more
theoretically satisfying. Instead, the purpose of this research was to investigate whether a CPE
can produce a more significant benefit for the population than can be achieved by the
spontaneous order inherent in the free market.
There is considerable confusion about what socialism, fascism, and free-market
capitalism are and, possibly more important, what they are not. Therefore, before proceeding,
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definitions and explanations are warranted. A centrally planned economy is “an economic
system in which the elements of an economy (as labor, capital, and natural resources) are subject
to government control and regulation designed to achieve the objectives of a comprehensive plan
of economic development” (Merriam-Webster 2021).
Lately, the words socialism and fascism have been carelessly bandied about in ways that
muddy and confuse the issue. For example, the above definition clarifies what a centrally
planned economy is, but many use socialism to mean other things. The social democracies of
Europe are not socialist; they are not CPEs. These governments are better characterized as
embracing welfare-state capitalism (Malleson 2014, 228). Socialism is also not Rawl’s propertyowning democracy (Pogge and Kosch 2007, 8). Neither is it democratic socialism. However, the
democratic socialists see it as a road to true socialism as expressed on their website: “We must
replace it with democratic socialism, a system where ordinary people have a real voice in our
workplaces, neighborhoods, and society. We believe there are many avenues that feed into the
democratic road to socialism” (dsausa.org). None of these clarifications are arguments that any
of these systems or philosophies are desirable; only that they are not socialism or CPEs.
Free-market capitalism is “an economic system characterized by private or corporate
ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision, and by
prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in
a free market” (Merriam-Webster 2021).
The misuse of the terms free-market and capitalism suffers from many of the same
problems as a centrally planned economy, fascism, and socialism. The word capitalism is the
most misused and misunderstood. This misuse has created undeserved negative feelings in the
public mind. Much of the negative perception of capitalism results from transferring government
failure to market failure.
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One example that serves particularly well is health care in the United States. In 1900, the
average American spent about one hundred dollars per year in today's dollars on healthcare. As
the quality of medicine increased, the costs rose to about five percent of annual income (Moseley
2008). Hospitals had a problem maintaining a steady income during the Great Depression, itself
a government failure, so in 1930 Baylor University Hospital offered a deal to 1250 Dallas public
school teachers. The terms of this deal were that the teachers would each pay fifty cents a month
and, in return, would get up to twenty-one days of hospital care at no additional charge (Morrisey
2014, 3-26).
This plan quickly caught on with other hospitals and eventually got the name Blue Cross.
It became somewhat readily available but not widely used until the government-imposed wage
and price controls in World War II. With a labor shortage and the inability of firms to increase
pay to attract workers, they began to offer health insurance based on the Blue Cross model. In
1943 the IRS determined that these benefits should be tax-free and, in 1954, increased the benefit
further (Moseley 2008). By 1960, most firms offered health care benefits, and in constant dollars,
between 1960 and 2015, medical professional incomes rose three hundred percent. During the
same period, the median income for all workers was raised only by less than one-tenth that much
(Tabarrok 2019). This inflationary behavior was entirely predictable since separating the
consumer and producer by intermediaries prevents the consumer from 'shopping' for the best
deal, so prices rise. There is apparent competition, but it is a medical monopoly.
Free-market capitalism (FMC) relies on competition to regulate prices and increase
productivity. Therefore, it is one of the responsibilities of the government to guarantee
competitiveness by preventing monopolistic trade practices. Unfortunately, the government has
been derelict in its duty in this regard. Tepper and Hearn (2019) list these examples:


Two corporations control 90 percent of the beer Americans drink.
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Five banks control about half of the nation’s banking assets.



Many states have health insurance markets where the top two insurers have an 80
percent to 90 percent market share. For example, in Alabama one company, Blue
Cross Blue Shield, has an 84 percent market share and in Hawaii it has 65 percent
market share.



When it comes to high-speed internet access, almost all markets are local
monopolies; over 75 percent of households have no choice with only one
provider.



Four players control the entire US beef market and have carved up the country.



After two mergers this year, three companies will control 70 percent of the
world’s pesticide market and 80 percent of the US corn-seed market (3).

Regulating these monopolistic practices is one of the legitimate roles of government intervention
into the economy and the government has been unduly lax in doing so.
Another fundamental problem is the difficulty of piercing the ‘corporate veil.’ The
problem was serious fifty-five years ago when the Yale Law Review (1967) wrote,
“Shareholders of real estate, entertainment, shipping, and manufacturing enterprises, for
example, have successfully used limited liability to escape personal responsibility for the torts of
their corporations. As a consequence, plaintiff law firms in metropolitan areas will often have
two to three cases a year in which their client's recovery is thwarted by the corporate fiction.” In
the ensuing half-century, the problem has only gotten worse. Common sense and common law
indicate that everyone should be accountable for their actions and not be able to resort to legal
loopholes to avoid responsibility.
Capitalism has had its failures, but the cause of most of these is corrupted capitalism,
often called cronyism or crony capitalism. This corruption of capitalism occurs when
government acts to advantage some actors over others. Aligica and Tarko (2014) discuss three
components shaping cronyism: the basic microeconomic foundation of rent-seeking, the
institutional-structural component of the embedding environment in which rent-seeking happens,
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and the ideological component providing legitimacy to the associated structures and processes
(161).
Some of the most common types of government-granted privileges given to individuals
and businesses providing them an unfair advantage are bailouts, loan guarantees, monopoly
advantage, no-bid contracts, occupational licensing, certificates of need, regulatory capture,
subsidies, tariffs, and other measures to restrict foreign competition and tax privileges. Most of
these are advances by interest groups in the form of lobbying. Hansen (2012) explains,
Lobbyists threaten national economic welfare in two ways. First, lobbyists
facilitate activity which economists term rent-seeking. One common form of
rent-seeking occurs when individuals or groups devote resources to capturing
government transfers, rather than putting them to a productive use, and lobbyists
are often the key actors securing such benefits. Second, lobbyists tend to
lobby for legislation that is itself an inefficient use of government resources,
such as funding the building of a ‘bridge to nowhere’ (197).
There are numerous forms of corrupted capitalism, but occupational licensing laws are
one of the most subtle and damaging to the economically vulnerable. Occupational licensing is a
form of government regulation requiring a license to pursue a profession or vocation for
compensation. While some forms of occupational licensing may be necessary to protect public
safety, many others are not. For example, requiring surgeons to receive some certification to be
allowed to practice medicine may be helpful, but often, occupational licensing is merely a way
for established businesses or industries to use the power of the government to reduce
competition. It is also one of the fastest areas of growth for corrupted capitalism. In the 1950s,
only one in 20 U.S. workers needed government permission to pursue their chosen occupation.
Today, it is closer to one in three. Research has shown that licensing neither protects public
health and safety nor improves products and services, but it is highly effective in limiting the
number of people who can create a job for themselves and earn a livable wage (Meyer 2018).
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Most states have 'certificate of need' (CON) laws or 'certificate of public convenience and
necessity’ (CPCN) laws. These laws are a type of licensing requirement that prevents many new
businesses from starting. Unlike other licensing laws, CONs and CPCNs do not require
education or training qualifications to obtain a business license. Rather, CONs and CPCNs
prevent new businesses from opening unless they can show to the state that new competition is in
the public interest or necessary or needed. These laws often become what Sandefur calls
‘competitor’s veto laws’ (Sandefur 2015, 1010). These laws are used regularly as a way for
existing businesses in an industry to restrict the entry of competing businesses. This is a
corruption of capitalism by government not the free market.
As damaging as rent-seeking and corrupted capitalism are to the economy, more severe
damage occurs beneath the surface. This is the damage that results from the harm done to the
reputation and understanding of capitalism and free markets in the public mind. On the one hand,
the government corrupts capitalism by its actions and, on the other, blames capitalism itself for
the ensuing corruption.
The government's failures to control monopolies, tinkering with wage and price controls,
and corrupting capitalism to benefit a few at the expense of many have created public pressure to
change the United States economic system. The current pressure to transition the United States
toward a CPE makes this research necessary. It has become critically important to answer
whether a CPE can result in greater economic good than can be achieved by spontaneous order,
as is created by the combination of individual choices, which make up the free market.
Furthermore, the repeated failures of CPEs may indicate that fundamental socio-economic
principles prevent their success. For example, Hayek (1988) postulated that the forecasting
necessary to a CPE is impossible; hence, effective planning is impossible (84). Therefore, this
paper will ask the research question: Is it possible to forecast economic variables with sufficient
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accuracy to allow a centrally planned economy result in greater economic good than can be
achieved by a free market? The answer to this question is essential to the public and
policymakers in determining the nation's course.
Since many believe that economic experts would do a better job controlling the economy
than the public, it was first necessary to investigate the efficacy of economic forecasting and its
viability for planning the economy. Sound planning requires sound foresight since it is
impossible to plan the future without knowledge of what will happen in the future. Christopher
Bullock (1716) coined the often-repeated truism, " 'Tis impossible to be sure of any thing but
Death and Taxes" (21). Advocates of central economic planning base their advocacy on the
assumption that economic experts can overcome this truism and be sufficiently sure of the action
of the economy to devise sound economic plans. They believe that central planning by economic
experts would make sounder decisions for the people than the people would make for themselves
through free markets. Hayek (1988) says they cannot because "What cannot be known cannot be
planned" (84).
We live in an uncertain world in which making predictions with certainty is seldom
possible. Some relatively accurate scientific models are helpful in the physical sciences, but even
those are not certain. This paper will explore the limits of forecasting models, mainly as applied
to economics. A discussion of the extent to which the world is ordered and predictable or more
unruly is also necessary to answer whether it is possible to plan well enough to direct a nation's
economy.
If planning an economy is analogous to growing a garden in a greenhouse where the
variables are within the gardener's control and forecasts about plant progress and needed
amendments are accurate, then a centrally planned economy (CPE) might succeed. However, if
the economy is more like a fenced outdoor garden subject to the effects of weather, insects,
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weeds, and unknown soil conditions, then a CPE's success seems more unlikely. If the economy
is more like an unfenced outdoor garden with animal predators that make predictions of their
own regarding what crops will be edible at what time and plan to arrive at the right time to
devour the harvest, then a CPE seems doomed to almost inevitable failure. If the economy is
more like a greenhouse garden, then forecasting future behavior should be relatively
straightforward, and most of those favoring a CPE assume that experts can perform this
forecasting successfully. On the other hand, if the economy is more like the natural world with
the weather, insects, and weeds, forecasting future behavior becomes more problematic. Finally,
if the garden is more like planting a garden in a wild area with predators that seem to know when
crops will mature better than the gardener, the possible success of CPEs becomes still more
difficult or impossible.
One might argue that a farm is much like one of the last two gardens, but farms are on a
much larger scale than gardens and, as a result, are far more able to withstand attacks by insects
and predators. The number of predators available to damage crops in a farming area is far lower
than in a garden surrounded by natural habitat.
This research answers the question of whether a CPE, or socialist model, is practical,
based upon the possibility of accurate forecasting. However, it does not argue the politics of
socialism or fascism versus free markets. Furthermore, it makes no moral judgments about the
competing economic systems. Those discussions, while valuable, are outside the realm of
economics and therefore better left to experts in other fields.
The question of whether a CPE can result in greater economic good than can be achieved
by spontaneous order, as is created by the combination of individual choices that make up the
free market can best be answered by breaking it into parts. It is necessary to address the question
across three domains that affect economic forecasting: the first is the accuracy of mathematical
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modeling in forecasting economic trends in a chaotic environment, the second is the prediction
and mitigation of boom-and-bust cycles, and the third is the effect of unpredictable "black swan"
events. First, Makridakis and Taleb (2009) address the domain of mathematical modeling,
explaining that it "fails when complex systems are involved" (843). Second, Kunieda and
Shibata (2016) address the domain of boom-and-bust cycles or bubbles, saying, "Because asset
bubbles are a symptom of financial frictions, a policy that cures the root cause of inefficiency
and instability should be proposed" (83). This paper will propose such a solution.
Finally, Taleb (2007) addresses the third domain, "black swans", by explaining that
people often use recent history in which no significant catastrophic events occurred to conclude
that they will never occur. "We are now subjected to the classical problem of induction: making
bold claims about the unknown based on assumed properties of the known" (198). The COVID19 pandemic is an example of a black swan affecting the economy unpredictably.
Chapter II of this dissertation reviews the existing literature on the topic. The review
finds reliable sources in each of the three domains, but none that address the combined effect of
these three domains on economic forecasting. Moreover, finding current sources that address
these issues directly in some of these areas has proven challenging. However, this paper will
present evidence from the literature in these three domains and examine the implications of the
combined effect of the three domains.
There is a great deal of existing research in the first domain of modeling and forecasting
in general and still more focused on economic forecasts in particular. There is also substantial
research in the second domain dealing with the growth and collapse of asset bubbles. In addition,
there is a third domain, black swan events, rare, unpredictable events with severe consequences.
However, there is little research that explores this third domain and its effect on economic
forecasting. Furthermore, there have been no attempts to synthesize the research in these three
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domains into a single meta-domain that can be analyzed as a whole to determine the combined
effect on forecasting. Thus, first, the investigation will address each domain in turn.
The research into the first domain, the viability of economic forecasting, is broken down
into more granular pieces that can be examined separately and then collectively. This division is
necessary because the existing research does not often delineate the differences in the types of
systems that are forecasted. There are simple systems that can be described very well by
elementary mathematical formulae. For example, given the characteristics of a guitar string, its
length, its temperature, and the tension applied to the string, one can calculate that plucking the
string will sound a particular, predictable pitch. These simple systems do not require
investigation because they are trivial. Furthermore, no one has suggested that the economy is a
simple system of this type.
Except in simple systems like the one above, a complete understanding of the present is
necessary to predict the future. As systems increase in complexity, the assumption that the
present is wholly understood logically fails. It fails because everyone understands the present
based upon models, sometimes mathematical, often mental (Senge 2006, 163). All models,
whether the most sophisticated statistical and mathematical models or a simpler mental model,
are simplified versions of reality whose value lies in making something easier to understand.
However, due to their simplicity, they are never entirely accurate. Cardell (2019) uses the
example of a doll. A doll is a model of a human, but it is an incomplete model. It is a simplified
representation of a person. It might be accurate enough to explore fashion or practice aspects of
parenting or learning about human proportions but does not help understand the circulatory
system. “Any model that accurately reflects all aspects of the system being modeled is no longer
a model but a copy. As a copy it loses its ability to simplify reality.” Virtually all human beings
tend to extend their mental models beyond their effective range. They metaphorically look inside
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the doll and decide that humans are full of cotton (5). Furthermore, even an actual living human
is not a completely accurate model of another human being or even a completely accurate model
of that same human being an hour earlier or an hour later.
Experts in the natural sciences using mathematical models are generally more successful
than social scientists; however, even those mathematical models have failings like the example
of the doll. They are never entirely accurate because they are simplifications.
The failure to thoroughly understand the present makes predicting the future impossible.
Cardell (2021) explains the problem using an example from physics. The equation, which is a
mathematical expression of a model, predicts the speed of a falling object at a future time using
the equation V = V0 + gt, where V is the velocity of the object at any time, V0 is the initial
velocity, g is the acceleration caused by gravity and t is time. This formula appears simple
enough; if one knows V0, g, and t, one can precisely calculate V. However, it is not nearly as
simple as it appears. An engineer would quickly point out that this equation only applies at
standard temperature and pressure in a vacuum. These conditions never exist in the actual world
and therefore provide only an estimated range of possible outcomes.
In each set of circumstances, it may be possible to predict a ninety percent probability
that a given object of a specific size, shape, and weight, falling for six seconds in the air on earth
with an initial altitude of sixteen thousand feet with the barometric pressure being between 27.9
and 28.1 inches of mercury with the temperature being sixty-two degrees Fahrenheit will be
falling between forty-five and forty-nine meters per second. The non-engineer might wonder
why the answer is so uncertain given such a simple formula. The engineer would answer that too
many variables are not included in the formula to make a more precise calculation possible. For
example, every cubic meter of air through which the object falls encompasses roughly ten
septillion molecules in independent motion. Each of them interacts with the others and the object
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in unpredictable ways. To arrive at an absolute answer, one must, among other factors, be able to
predict the position and motion of each of these septillion molecules. It would also have to
account for temperature and pressure changing unpredictably as the object descends. That is, a
complete understanding of the present would be needed to make a more accurate prediction
about the future.
While these systems are complex, the relationships are straightforward if all the facts
could ever be made known. However, as the number of actors in a system increases, the
complexity of the relationships among the actors becomes even more complex. The introduction
of complex relationships in addition to complex systems results in chaotic systems.
Harari (2018) explains that “Chaotic systems come in two shapes” (loc 3670). Level one
chaos is chaos that is not self-referential. For example, the weather is a chaotic system of this
type; every action triggers “ripples” that radiate outward in all directions in a system of this type.
Edward Lorenz discovered chaos theory accidentally when he made a slight alteration in one of
the input variables in a weather model he was working on, and the change resulted in a
dramatically divergent outcome. He described it as the ‘butterfly effect,’ which he explained
using a metaphor describing how a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil could contribute to a
tornado in Texas (Lorenz 1972). This type of chaos implies that any action may precipitate
outcomes that are impossible to predict, no matter how small.
Harari (2018) defines level two chaos as the “chaos that reacts to predictions made about
it” (loc 7353). The stock market is an example of such a system. Predictions of future stock
prices affect buying and selling, which results in price changes.
Combining the research on models and forecasts with research on government economic
interventions and past economic disasters resulting from bubbles and the failure of governments
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to predict and respond to them will demonstrate the impossibility of economic forecasting.
Showing that forecasting is impossible can be extended to prove that planning is also impossible.
Chapter III of this dissertation describes the methods used to research the failure of expert
forecasting and the creation of models to describe these failures. If forecasting is impossible,
then discovering theoretical justifications for this impossibility becomes essential to complete
our understanding. These theoretical justifications will lead to proposed research-supported roles
of government in the economic sector. As in Chapter II each domain will be addressed by
investigating each of the three domains in turn. First, data was collected to assess historical
forecasting accuracy. This collection includes thirty years of forecasts of personal consumption
expenditures (gRPCEs) by the staff of the Federal Reserve and comparing the projections with
the results. It also includes examining existing data on the accuracy of the Federal Reserve and
others to forecast other aspects of the economy. The data show a history of forecasting failure.
The data collected and analyzed on gRPCEs show an average error of about eight percent with
some errors as much as thirty-five percent in either direction with a standard deviation of thirteen
percent for predictions one year in advance.
In addition to data collections, creating system dynamics models in the first two domains
provides explanations for those economic behaviors. These system dynamics models are
graphical representations of complex systems many of which have equations that cannot be
solved, only numerically evaluated. In the first domain, two system dynamics models have been
created that explain the chaotic behavior of the economy based upon interrelated but
straightforward inputs. In the second domain, a system dynamics model explains asset bubbles as
a function of profit-motivated speculation. This model leads to proposed appropriate government
action designed to eliminate asset bubbles by directly addressing the rent-seeking that creates
them. This proposal may prevent asset bubbles from forming and collapsing. Constructing
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models concerning black swan events was not pursued since their random occurrence is not
suitable for modeling. Discovering whether CPEs can provide more significant economic
benefits than the free market and what actions government might take instead will be of great
value to those seeking to improve public economic policy.
Chapter IV presents both the data analysis and the models in each of the three domains.
These results of all three are then combined into an integrated whole to answer the research
question. As in the previous two chapters, this chapter presents the findings in each of the three
domains. There are sections on failure due to chaos, failure due to bubbles, and failure due to
black swans. Examining the data from the personal consumption expenditures from 1985 to 2015
demonstrates failure in all three domains. The general errors are the results of chaotic behavior.
The extremes are attributable to the asset bubble of 1985-87 and the housing bubble of 2007-8.
Finally, the black swan pandemic of 2020 is responsible for the most significant errors in
economic forecasting history. The data indicate a forty-three percent chance of chaos distorting
the gRPCE projections severe enough to upset planning, a nineteen percent chance of an asset
bubble creating such a distortion, and a five percent chance of a black swan doing so. Combining
these probabilities results in a fifty-six percent probability that at least one of these events will
create a severe distortion in the gRPCE. This indicates that gRPCE forecasting is not as good as
flipping a coin. Planning based upon the kinds of odds is unsound and likely to do more harm
than good.
Chapter V of this dissertation presents a summary of the research, draws conclusions, and
presents recommendations. What is the answer to the research question: Is it possible to forecast
economic variables with sufficient accuracy to allow a centrally planned economy result in
greater economic good than can be achieved by a free market? The preponderance of the
evidence uncovered in this investigation indicates that the answer to the research question is no.
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The evidence shows that a centrally planned economy cannot result in greater economic good
than can be achieved by spontaneous order, as is created by the combination of individual
choices that make up the free market. The evidence shows that turning right at the crossroads
would be the best course, followed by straight ahead and lastly turning left.
This research recommends that the government's efforts to 'reform' free-market
capitalism be limited to serving as an impartial referee whose task is to ensure that everyone is
playing by the rules. This recommendation includes eliminating all forms of corrupted
capitalism, including bailouts, loan guarantees, monopoly advantage, no-bid contracts,
occupational licensing, regulatory capture, subsidies, measures to restrict foreign competition by
tariffs and other means, and tax privileges. That would boost the economy and reassure the
citizenry that free-market capitalism is fair and beneficial to all.
Finally, this research presents solutions in each domain. In the domain of chaos, the
solution is to mitigate every forecast by acknowledging its inherent inaccuracy or possibly to
abandon the attempt, knowing that it is not helpful. Attempting to control a complex system in a
top-down manner is analogous to using the conscious mind to control all the autonomic functions
of the human body. It is impossible, and that impossibility must be acknowledged. In the domain
of bubbles, the recognition that profit-motivated speculation is the proximal cause of these
bubbles leads to proposing a special tax that is likely to dampen or eliminate asset bubbles at
their origin and provide a greater incentive to make wise economic investments.
In the domain of black swans, the proposed solution is that government mimics the
behavior of private citizens regarding black swans. Citizens prepare for black swans by readily
having the necessary tools and supplies to see them through a tumultuous event. This
preparedness may include emergency savings, a survival stock of food, a generator, and
emergency first aid supplies. The recent pandemic, which many label as a black swan, shows

18

how fatally unprepared the government was to cope with an event of this magnitude despite the
1918 Spanish flu pandemic warning. Furthermore, the government's wrong-headed attempts to
mitigate the economic fallout triggered the most severe inflation in decades instead of solving the
problem. The other thing citizens do to prepare is to buy insurance. While the government cannot
go out and buy insurance, it can self-insure. Instead of borrowing to help the citizens in a
pandemic, the government should create a special fund consuming five percent of the annual
budget until at least six months of annual expenditures are acquired. Then the government, like
its citizens, would benefit both from the additional security and from receiving interest on its
savings.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review examines the literature to find evidence supporting or refuting
Hayek’s belief (Hayek 1988) that “What cannot be known cannot be planned” (84). It appears
there is sufficient evidence that Hayek was correct. It examines the previous research
surrounding whether an economy, planned by experts, can result in greater economic good than
can be achieved by spontaneous order created by the combination of individual choices that
make up the free market? Its division into several relevant sections leads the reader through
research on the nature of free-market and planned economies, the weakness of modeling, how
economic models fail, and the problems of chaotic systems, asset bubbles, and black swans.
It seems wise to qualify this literature review by saying that the reader will surely notice
that it contains fewer recent references than might be desirable. The research into the
effectiveness of forecasting has diminished in recent years. The research into asset bubbles has
also slowed substantially, and research concerning black swans has also become less available.
However, many existing works are highly cited in more recent literature and therefore may be
considered seminal.

What Is a Centrally Planned Economy?
Gwartney (2019) defines socialism, the most common version of centrally planned
economies, this way, “A system of economic organization in which (1) the ownership and
control of the basic means of production rest with the state and (2) resource allocation is
determined by centralized planning rather than by market forces” (36). In planned economies,
political forces rather than market forces move the economy.
Higgs (2012) explains that government is necessary because there are some tasks only
government can perform. He agrees with Mises saying, a strong but limited government allows
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its citizens to be productive and free (3). However, Higgs is concerned that the United States
may be moving toward fascism or socialism (2).
Rothbard (2009) describes controlled economies as an economic order in which the
government owns or controls the entire production system. They are the forced abolition of the
market, the state's monopolization of the entire economy. He adds, "There are two and only two
ways that any economy can be organized. One is by freedom and voluntary choice—the way of
the market. The other is by force and dictation—the way of the State" (loc 958).
Forrester (1969), the founder of system dynamics, in Urban Dynamics, presents a
systems approach to dealing with government economic planning by analyzing the problems of
an aging city. He used a system dynamics model run on an IMB 360/67 to make all the
calculations required by the interrelated differential equations. He extensively used the model in
Lowell, MA, and later Boston, Concord, and Marlborough, MA. It is a seminal book because it is
essentially a theory of the forces that constrain human communities that constrain human history.
It is also an indication that centrally planned economies oppose those constraints and could be
why they have never succeeded in the long term.

What Is Free-market Capitalism?
Sternberg (2015) writes that it is necessary to develop a concise and accurate definition of
capitalism that makes it unambiguously clear what it is and what it is not. She argues that this is
necessary because many forms of hyphenated capitalism, such as welfare capitalism and crony
capitalism, misuse the term and, in fact, impute to capitalism characteristics that are anticapitalist. She says that absent a precise definition, those advocating for capitalism are
“handicapped” by being forced to attempt to defend an amorphous term that, for many,
incorrectly includes aspects that are undefendable (380). She defines capitalism, writing,
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“Capitalism is an economic system characterised by comprehensive private property, free-market
pricing, and the absence of coercion” (385).

What Free-market Capitalism Is Not
Free-market capitalism is not the big-government quasi-capitalism existing in the United
States today. True free-market capitalism is far more like the markets envisioned by the nation’s
founders. The most meaningful change between the current state and original intent is the growth
of the federal government, which has taken several forms: federal spending, federal regulations,
federal usurpation of states’ rights, and federal economic manipulation. The Founder’s intended
government’s role to be divided among the nation, the states, the localities, and the people. The
Founders envisioned a federal government that was somewhat stronger than the Articles of
Confederation provided, but only somewhat more. The size and power of the federal government
have grown to encompass a far more significant role than the Founders would have imagined. In
2016, federal taxes took sixty-five percent of all taxes collected, leaving twenty percent for the
states and fifteen percent for localities (Taxpolicycenter.org n.d.). In 1840, federal government
revenues were about one-third of all revenue collected. Just prior to the Civil War, federal
revenues rose slightly reaching about thirty-nine percent. In 1870, federal revenue had ballooned
to sixty percent of revenue (Chantrill 2019). Money is power. If we accept that the Founders
might have equated local government as synonymous with the people, the federal government
now has two-thirds of the power, the states’ one-fifth, and the people less than one-sixth.
The federal government has now assumed far more power than the enumerated powers
the Constitution granted it. Higgs (2012) provides a thorough accounting of the growth of the
federal government's power but focuses primarily on the period since 1900. It might be
instructive to examine the time before that to see if what happened then directly affected what
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happened later. It may also be illuminating to examine whether the crises were the proximal
cause or if they were 'ratchets', as Higgs describes, doing the heavy lifting in service of other
forces (2012, 30). Higgs questions why crisis did not engender 'Big Government' in the
nineteenth century (2012, 258). It is possible that they did.
Growth usually follows one of three patterns: linear (arithmetic), exponential (geometric),
or logistic. Linear and exponential growth both occur in the absence of limits and are relatively
rare. Logistic growth, in the beginning, looks just like exponential growth but levels off as it
approaches a limit. The graph below (Figure 4) shows Federal Spending as a Percent of GDP as
a function of time. It also offers a logistic model of the data. The model shows how growth in
spending might have occurred after smoothing out all the anomalies. This model asserts a 16%
per decade increase in spending as a percent of GDP and a limit of 40%.

Figure 4
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The blue line is the actual data smoothed by decade (Senate.gov 2015), and the red line is
the model. The model fits the data well enough to support the hypothesis that crises, including
the Civil War, did indeed engender ‘Big Government’ but that the Civil War was still early in the
growth pattern when the rate of change was still relatively low. Figure 5, below, shows the data
not smoothed by decade (Senate.gov 2015).

Figure 5
Sen. Thomas Hart Benton predicted in 1826 that any increase in federal spending would
have a catastrophic multiplying effect saying, “The actual increase of federal power and
patronage…will be, not in the arithmetical ratio, but in geometrical progression” (Weisberger
1997). Benton’s prediction of exponential growth preceded the mathematical explanation of
logistic growth, but he foresaw the first half of the curve correctly. Average federal spending
from 1790 to 1860 was 1.63% of GDP; however, from 1870 to 1910, it increased abruptly,

24

averaging 3.19% of GDP, a growth of 96% or about double. (Senate.gov 2015). Another
measure of government growth is the Official Registers of the United States. By 1861, the
volume had grown to 592 pages. By 1891, the Official Register had nearly doubled to 990 pages
(Weisberger 1997).
Based on the above arguments, Higgs ‘Crisis Hypothesis’ can be seen to include the
antebellum period; however, the mathematical model suggests an underlying ‘natural growth’
that is exploiting these crises. One candidate for that underlying factor is the psychological
changes that occur as an enterprise matures. For example, the Founders were governmental
entrepreneurs, probably the first in human history. However, succeeding generations have
become less entrepreneurial and more managerial; they have no perceived vested interest in
inventing government but simply managing it.
This psychological change is not unique. All organizations, countries, religious
movements, and long-term human endeavors fall prey to the cultural equivalent of the principle
in physics called entropy. This principle states that the arrow of energy points from organization
to disorganization, and anything put together will immediately begin slowly falling apart. In any
culture, national, corporate, religious, or other, the descendants of those who established the
culture begin to resemble the entrepreneurs, the originators, less and less. The driving
organizational force of the entrepreneur grows weaker as time passes.
There is psychological research that shows that entrepreneurs and managers are
fundamentally different from each other. Some of these differences include entrepreneurs being
more self-confident, believing that they can control the outcomes in their environment, being
highly resilient in the face of stress, and tending to have lower levels of neuroticism than
managers (Usc.edu n.d.). It is reasonable to suggest that as the time from the founding of an
enterprise increases, the people involved move away from being entrepreneurs and toward being
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managers. During this progression, the population and its leaders become increasingly risk
intolerant (Sari Pekkala Kerr, Kerr, and Xu 2017). Consider the westward expansion of the
United States; the trailblazers, the entrepreneurs, were quite different from the pioneers who
followed them. Following those pioneers were settlers who were quite different from the
pioneers and bore no resemblance to the trailblazers. This progression seems to be present in all
human endeavors and may be the driving factor behind the logistic growth of statism in the
United States. Looking at the psychological differences between entrepreneurs and managers,
they would respond very differently to crises. Therefore, early crises, like the Civil War, would
have a more negligible effect on people closer to the entrepreneurial type and a more significant
effect as the population shifts toward the managerial type.
One of the problems deriving from the growth of government power is the growth of
actors using government to achieve their own ends. The French economist Frédéric Bastiat
described cronyism and its effects most succinctly in a pamphlet in June of 1850. He said, "As
long as it is admitted that the law may be diverted from its true purpose — that it may violate
property instead of protecting it — then everyone will want to participate in making the law,
either to protect himself against plunder or to use it for plunder. Political questions will always
be prejudicial, dominant, and all-absorbing" (Bastiat 1850). Protecting capitalism from
corruption necessitates that the law must not be allowed to "be diverted from its true purpose". It
may be instructive to review how this diversion was allowed to occur in the United States.
There is sufficient evidence that the increase in government intervention in the economy
of the United States has its roots in the latter part of the nineteenth century and very early
twentieth (Weinstein 1968, ix). The evidence indicates that this increase in intervention is the
result of cronyism. Kolko (1965) makes the case that it began with the railroad barons of the late
nineteenth century when increasing competition was causing them serious problems. These
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problems led them to seek political solutions that increased regulation (3–5). Once these railroad
barons had ‘broken the ice’ and diverted the law from its true purpose and the ever-increasing
cycle began as Bastiat predicted, as everyone began to see the law as a financial tool to be
exploited.
It did not take long for the power-seekers to learn that, in Rahm Emanuel’s words, “You
never want a serious crisis to go to waste” (n.d.). Higgs (2012) posits that the growth of the
federal government was a direct cause of the sort of thinking described in Emanuel’s premise.
Higgs describes the progression from the depression of the 1890s that ultimately led to the 16th
Amendment allowing an income tax, the creation of the Federal Reserve, and the Adamson Act,
which created a minimum wage (106-122). Following this increase in federal control was the
exploitation of the crises of World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold
War. Each of these crises led to an increase in federal control that resulted in a far different
distribution of power than was intended by the Founders. The Founder’s intent was for the
government’s role to be divided among the nation, the states, the localities, and the people. They
envisioned a federal government of limited power; instead, it has grown to encompass a far more
significant role than they would ever have imagined. As previously mentioned, from 1840 to
2016, federal taxes about doubled as a fraction of all taxes collected from about one-third to
about two-thirds.
One of the most seriously flawed results of federal intervention may have produced the
most disastrous results of all. It is the story of Dr. Ancel Keys and the American diet. It is an
example of what Franks (2016) warns about; “Professionals are a high-status group, but what
gives them their lofty position is learning, not income. They rule because they are talented,
because they are smart. A good sociological definition of professionalism is “a second
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hierarchy”—second to the main hierarchy of money, that is—based on credentialed expertise”
(22).
In the 1950s, the American Heart Association invested millions in heart disease research
(Teicholz 2014, 48). In 1961, Keys, who had no nutrition science or cardiology training,
managed to get himself and an ally onto the AHA nutrition committee. Keys hypothesized that
saturated fat and cholesterol were influential factors in heart attacks and strokes. Without
evidence supporting that position, Keys and the company persuaded the committee to include
recommendations for 'reasonable substitutions' corn or soybean oil for saturated fats (Teicholz
2014, 48). Later that year, Keys was featured on the cover of Time magazine along with Keys'
advice to cut dietary fat down to fifteen percent of total calories (Teicholz 2014, 49). The rest of
the media picked up the ball and ran with it. Study after study failed to provide evidence to
support Keys claims, but his outsized reputation kept him from being discredited. At the same
time, other researchers produced credible research indicating that it was not fat but carbohydrates
that were the actual culprit (Teicholz 2014, 59).
"When Congress adopted the diet-heart hypothesis, the idea gained ascendancy as an allruling, unassailable dogma, and from this point on, there has been virtually no turning back"
(Teicholz 2014, 103). In 1980, the USDA released its Dietary Guidelines for America. (Teicholz
2014, 135). The result has been an epidemic. As of 2016, the latest year for which official data is
available, almost 40% of adults in the United States were obese, almost double the 1988-1994
period when just over 22% of adults were obese (Byrnes 2018).
This debacle might be some of the most substantial evidence that statist intervention,
influenced by lobbyists pursuing their own agendas, can cause real disasters. The United States
government may be responsible for the millions of early deaths of people who trusted that their
government knew what it was doing when it did not.

28

Any attempt by the government to affect the economy is an experiment that has an
uncertain outcome. Using a country of three hundred fifty million people as guinea pigs to test a
theory that has the potential to ruin countless lives is unjust. If experiments are necessary, they
should happen at the lower levels of government. Policy experiments should be held to the same
standards as drug trials since they have as much or more potential to harm.
Cronyism and rent-seeking require statist intervention, the exercise of government power,
to have any effect. If the state has the power to intervene, those affected by those interventions
will attempt to manipulate them. In an interview, Hayek suggests a division of power to
eliminate the possibility of government intervention. He suggests an upper house with the
responsibility for setting general rules of conduct and a lower house that created specific laws to
enforce the provisions of the upper house. He says, “The first unable to discriminate and the
second unable to take any coercive action except to enforce general laws” (Hayek n.d.). Whether
or not this could work as well as he imagines, it is not practical as a way forward in the United
States as it would require an entirely restructured constitution.
Aligica and Tarko discuss three components shaping cronyism: the basic microeconomic
foundation of rent-seeking, the institutional-structural component of the embedding environment
in which rent-seeking happens, and the ideological component providing legitimacy to the
associated structures and processes (2014, 161). The institutional-structural component includes,
"Monetary policy … comprises the Federal Reserve's actions and communications to promote
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates--the three economic
goals the Congress has instructed the Federal Reserve to pursue" (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System n.d.). By definition, anything the Fed does is an intervention into the
economy, and there is no evidence that these interventions are necessary or even helpful and a
great deal of evidence that they have occasionally caused severe harm.
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For example, Milton Friedman showed that the Great Depression of the 1930s occurred
primarily because of actions by the Federal Reserve and showed how policy changes could
prevent it from happening again. Ben Bernanke, when the Federal Reserve chairman, publicly
told Friedman, “Regarding the Great Depression,” he declared, “you’re right. We did it. We’re
very sorry. But, thanks to you, we won’t do it again” (Wapshott 2011, 269). However, Bernanke
made his own mistakes leading to the 2007-2009 recession (The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission 2011). As a result, many would argue in favor of abolishing the Federal Reserve.
Investment editor Lance Gaitan explains, “Central banks are partnerships created between
bankers and politicians. The political side gets spendable money (created from nothing) without
having to raise taxes, while bankers get commissions or interest payments in perpetuity. A sweet
deal for both sides!” (Gaitan 2017).
There are numerous forms of cronyism, but occupational licensing laws are one of the
most subtle and damaging to the economically vulnerable. Occupational licensing is a form of
government regulation requiring a license to pursue a profession or vocation for compensation.
While some forms of occupational licensing may be necessary to protect public safety, many
others do not. Occupational licensing is often used as a way for established businesses or
industries to use the power of the government to reduce competition. As mentioned in Chapter I,
in the 1950s, only about five percent of U.S. workers needed government permission to pursue
their chosen occupation. Today, it has risen to about thirty percent. Meyer (2018) shows that
licensing neither protects public health and safety nor improves products and services, but it is
highly effective in limiting the number of people who can create a job for themselves and earn a
livable wage (Meyer 2018).
Take, for example, the case of Kine Gueye. Kine grew up in a village in Senegal where
every girl learns traditional African hair braiding. She moved to the United States and settled in
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Louisville, Kentucky. She sometimes worked 12 hours a day braiding hair in her Louisville
home, earning between $80 and $250 per customer. As her practice expanded, so did her family.
She married, had children, and moved her practice into a storefront (Erickson 2018). When she
began advertising her services, the government shut down Kine because she did not have a
cosmetology license. Getting such a license would require nearly two years of school and
$16,000 tuition. She had the necessary skills, and her work posed no threat to public safety. She
fought back, and eventually; Governor Matt Bevin signed a bill in 2016 exempting hair braiders
from the state’s cosmetology regulations. Nevertheless, a cronyist policy had attempted to
prevent her from earning a living, and since the bill only exempts braiders, other budding
entrepreneurs will have to fight for exemptions of their own.
The most disturbing trend in American politics today is a shift toward an acceptance by
much of the population of socialism as a viable form of government. Much of this shift is due to
what many perceive as a failure of capitalism. However, virtually all the failures cited are not
failures of capitalism but the corruption of capitalism by elitism, cronyism, and rent-seeking. The
results are alarming. Aligica and Tarko conclude that cronyism “may be emerging as one of the
most important challenges to democratic market capitalism (be it in the neoliberal or socialdemocratic form). Hence, the endeavor to better understand its nature, structure, functioning, and
dynamics as well as the variety of its ideological disguises, becomes an important and
challenging task” (2014, 173).
Aligica and Tarko’s concern is well-founded; in 1982, the Democratic Socialists of
America had only six thousand members, by 2012, the membership had increased to about sixtyfive hundred. However, since 2012, the membership growth has been alarmingly rapid. In 2019,
the membership had grown eight hundred sixty percent, to more than fifty thousand, and is now
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doubling every two years (Schwartz 2017). Using the Democratic Socialists of America website
data, performing an exponential regression yielded the equation below.

Here n is the membership in the Democratic Socialists of America and t is the time in
years since 2012. The regression has an R-squared value of .96, indicating that the regression
equation explains ninety-six percent of the variation in the data. An R-squared value of .96 is
considered an exceptionally good correlative fit. If this trend continues, the Democratic
Socialists of America will outnumber both the Republicans and Democrats by 2047.
The growth of public acceptance of socialism is not the only reason for concern.
Creeping socialism is equally worrisome. The power of the federal government grows with
revenue. As discussed earlier, from 1790 to 1860, the average federal spending consumed 1.63%
of GDP. From 1870 to 1910, it nearly doubled, averaging 3.19% of GDP, a growth of ninety-six
percent (senate.gov 2015). As concerning as that growth was, in 2018, the United States
government spent more than six times that much, taking 20.8% of GDP
(Usgovernmentspending.com 2019).
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek says, “It is one of the saddest spectacles of our time to
see a great democratic movement support a policy which must lead to the destruction of
democracy, and which meanwhile can benefit only a minority of the masses who support it”
(2007, 4988). Many refer to this shift as the slippery slope theory. Alves and Meadowcroft use
data to attempt to refute Hayek’s slippery slope theory saying,
“Hayek’s slippery slope hypothesis is therefore left in a very uncomfortable position: if
government expenditure can sustainably account for half (or in some cases even more) of GDP
with no apparent decline in economic or political freedom, and therefore no apparent signs of a
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slippery slope materialising, then very little of salience would appear to be left in the argument”
(2014, 851).
Alves and Meadowcroft may not have examined their data closely enough since
performing regression analysis on their data concludes that Hayek was correct. Once we have
performed an exponential regression on the average of the ten countries supplied by Alves and
Meadowcroft (Figure 6), we find that the average government will control one hundred percent
of GDP after sixty years. The r-squared value, .95, of the resulting equation, indicates that it
models the data provided exceptionally well.
Alves and Meadowcroft seem to have incorrectly concluded that because it has not
happened thus far, it would never happen, but their data does not support that conclusion.

Figure 6
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As damaging as cronyism is to the economy, the damage it does to the public perception
of capitalism is a more significant problem. “A free market is by definition a business
environment in which companies produce products and services valued by consumers at a cost
they are willing to pay, free from special advantages created by government” (Winters 2019).
However, people who do not understand that a free market includes freedom from cronyism then
mistakenly channel the contamination caused by cronyism into an attack on capitalism itself.
Policies that provide protections, special preferences, or subsidies to their friends or sponsors to
give them an unfair advantage over their competition are destroyers of free markets, not innocent
participants.
Some would argue that government needs to intervene when the free-market sets value
unfairly. This assertion is an economic fallacy. One of today's current trends is a campaign for a
fifteen-dollar-per-hour minimum wage based upon the notion that anything below that is not a
living wage. It is also a form of cronyism, lobbying by special interest groups. Some of those
making these arguments for a minimum wage say that everyone deserves their fair share of the
GDP. Frank (2016) says it this way, "Workers' share of the gross national product (as opposed to
the share taken by investors) hit a record low in 2011—and then it stayed there right through the
recovery. It is there to this day; economists now regard its collapse as a quasi-permanent
development" (1-2). This reasoning ignores the fact that GDP stands for Gross
Domestic Product. The argument fails because it uses a measure of production to evaluate
income. The correct conclusion would not be that those whose incomes are insufficient are
underpaid but that they are underproducing. That is not to say they are lazy but may need to look
for ways to exploit their skills and talents to create more economic value. Furthermore, Mitchell
shows the actual cost of cronyism reduces GDP by twenty percent over thirty years (2012).
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The Viability of Economic Forecasting
Thus far, centrally planned economies (CPEs) have never succeeded in providing more
significant economic benefit to their citizens than free-market capitalism. Sound economic
planning years in advance is essential if they are ever to do so. This planning requires accurate
forecasting. Accurate forecasting requires a complete understanding of the current state and what
the current state and current actions will produce in the future. Understanding the difficulty of
this task requires an investigation of models, both mental and mathematical. Every aspect of our
perception of the world is made comprehensible through mental models (Senge 2006, 163).
Reality is incomprehensible, so we create mental simplifications that are at our level of
comprehension. These are models, as a doll is a model of a human, or a toy car is a model of the
real thing. We need models, but we need to be aware that these models are simplifications and
have limited accuracy. To understand the failure of economic planning, we must understand the
nature and use of models.
One serious flaw in most models is their failure to incorporate the fact that nothing in the
real world exists in isolation; everything is part of a system. People tend to base conclusions on
the facts before them ignoring the complex subtleties of the system encompassing those facts.
Senge (2020) explains, people “still mostly see things as separate. A chair. A tree. A person.
How is it that this habit of awareness persists in the face of a century of scientific evidence to the
contrary?” The object’s place in the system is more important than the object itself (58).
Richardson (1979) presents the advantages and disadvantage of using models in a variety
of contexts. She explains that “While physical principles are well understood and stable enough
to be predictable, social, economic, and political behavior is not well understood, not stable, and
not very predictable (with some exceptions) except within broad limits“ (2).
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She goes on to explain what a model is and is not, how a model is constructed and enumerates
seven limitations of models. She lists them as incompleteness, the assumption that the future will
be like the past, data problems, the clarity of operational status, the uncertainty of input data, the
limitations imposed by the original purpose, and giving undo confidence to the apparent
precision of a model. She discusses each of these in detail and, in addition, provides questions
that a model user should have asked and answered before using a model. She concludes by
saying, “The proper use of models can add considerable insight to the policymaking process, but
model output should be regarded only as approximations. Only if policymakers are aware of the
limitations inherent in models can mathematical modeling enhance the policymaking process”
(2).
In writing about forecasting with models during the 2020-21 pandemic Siegenfeld, Taleb,
and Bar-Yam (2020) say that models can help discover methods to mitigate the virus' spread.
However, they caution that,
It is important to distinguish between what models can and cannot predict. All models'
assumptions fail to describe the details of most real-world systems. However, these
systems may possess large-scale behaviors that do not depend on all these details. A
simple model that correctly captures these large-scale behaviors but gets some details
wrong is useful; a complicated model that gets some details correct but mischaracterizes
the large-scale behaviors is misleading at best (16092).
They conclude their article by saying that using models to forecast elements of the
pandemic illustrates the "difference between academically relevant research and policy-relevant
analysis" (16095).
They say that "The former can tolerate assumptions and models that are exploratory in
nature, increasing our knowledge of the wide range of conditions that might happen at some time
in the future or some location—or even in an alternative reality—thereby increasing the scope of
our understanding. The latter must focus on validated assumptions and real-world risk, including
uncertainty in both our data and our understanding" (16095).
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Sterman (2002) speaks particularly bluntly, saying, "All decisions are based on models
… and all models are wrong" (525). He explains that these two statements are the most difficult
to grasp because they are profoundly counterintuitive. However, failure to accept them is to
surrender to what philosophers call naive realism; they believe that it is true because they think a
thing is true. He argues that "human perception and knowledge are limited, that we operate from
the basis of mental models, that we can never place our mental models on a solid foundation of
Truth because a model is a simplification, an abstraction, a selection, because our models are
inevitably incomplete, incorrect—wrong" (525).
He expresses the difficulty in recognizing the limitations of our beliefs and asks, "how
are we to make decisions if all models are wrong?" (525). He advocates striving to develop
enhanced critical thinking skills and confidently and continually challenge our mental models
and uncover our biases. He discusses the difficulty of walking a fine line between
acknowledging the limits of our understanding and not allowing our humility to prevent us from
acting decisively (525).
Makridakis (1981) explains that the evidence indicates that forecasting can be reasonably
accurate when continuations of set patterns or associations are concerned. However, when
systemic changes occur, forecasting accuracy is dramatically less precise. Furthermore, the
probability of such changes occurring is seldom known beforehand. In addition, as the
forecasting distance increases, the probability that systematic changes will occur in these patterns
or associations also increases, creating even more significant forecasting errors (11). He
summarizes by saying, "To be specific, forecasting the continuation of an existing trend is easy;
however, predicting changes in trends ... is almost impossible" (11). By way of example, he
adds, "the prediction of continuations of growth in economic variables can be achieved without
difficulty, while the prediction of recessions is inaccurate" (11).
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Makridakis concludes that we must accept the following:
(a) forecasting cannot be accurate when systematic changes from established patterns are
involved; (b) explanatory or causal models cannot answer adequately 'if then' type
question where systematic changes from established relationships are concerned; (c) it is
extremely difficult or impossible to predict systematic changes from established patterns
or relationships by quantitative models because these changes are not, by definition,
recurrent; (d) whether people accept it or not, their judgment exhibits serious biases
which are particularly pertinent in the type of tasks required by forecasting, planning and
strategy; (e) forecasting includes monitoring, understanding and adjustments which are
tasks equally critical for extrapolative forecasting: (f) planning and strategy must
explicitly recognize the separation between continuations of established patterns or
relationships and systematic changes, and the need to formalize the decision—making
process involved in doing so (20).
Atkinson (2004) presents two views of economics: one based on Newton’s theory of
science and the other more like Darwin’s. The Newtonian view sees economics as static: as
individuals exercise their natural right to pursue their interests unburdened by disturbing
elements, they would be promoting the good of society and their welfare. Consequently, this
state of natural harmony may be disturbed only by external forces but restoring the balance
should happen quickly. The Darwinian view sees economics as evolving and shaped by human
institutions rather than the humans outside of the institutions. This article presents a unique and
vital view not found in more current publications.
Dantas (2015) presents another view of economics and all the social sciences based
primarily on Hayek's postulate about the complexity of social phenomena. Hayek's premise
revolves around the notion that social scientists in general and economists, in particular, cannot
study this sort of complexity under laboratory conditions. They cannot explore events in a way
that allows them to "repeat, manipulate and decompose" those events. This failure makes it
impossible for these social scientists to make precise predictions like those in the natural sciences
that can use a laboratory setting (2).
Okes (2003) explains that the anachronistic idea that organizations, including government
organizations, are more like machines than living organisms not tenable. He says that in complex
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adaptive systems, cause and effect are nonlinear, bidirectional, and self-organizing. He claims
that because of this, "Maximum performance of the system is achieved when it operates at the
edge of chaos" (35).
Foster (2005) explains that recent work in complex systems creates fundamental
problems for economists since virtually all economic systems are complex. He says that
economic systems have four basic properties:


They are dissipative structures that transform energy for the good of the system.



It is both a whole and a part of greater wholes.



It exhibits some degree of irreversibility.



It can only be understood through a study of the "explicit historical time
dimension" (875).

Conventional economic theory makes assumptions about the system that are not
warranted. Most conventional theorists assume that they have a well-ordered state or are at least
capable of achieving one. Since these structures can evolve, they necessarily involve an
intermingling of order and disorder. He concludes by saying, "The behaviour of complex
adaptive systems cannot be captured by constrained optimisation models. This is a fundamental
departure from the presumptions inherent in conventional economics. Such systems have to be
analysed 'in' time, and this limits the way that mathematics can be used" (889).
As we have become more sophisticated, our models have become more complex, and we
have developed mathematics to support them, but they are still constrained. Hritonenko and
Yatsenko (2013) explain that mathematical models or models of any kind are not copies of the
world as it is; no, they are always simplifications of the world as it is, that can help us learn by
discovering essential features of the part of the actual world we are studying.
In theoretical research or decision-making practice, people use models because they do
not possess an absolute knowledge of reality” (2). Models always begin as mental
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models. Research can improve and provide justification for these mental models.
Mathematical models are derived from these mental models and therefore are limited in
their ability to inform by the mental model that underlies them. “However, they allow for
finding new insights that are impossible to obtain by other scientific methods (Hritonenko
and Yatsenko 2013, 2).
Forrester (1971) explains that planning failure frequently results from the problem space
existing as a self-regulating system (6-8). Such systems can change to correct for the influence of
outside events and interventions. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is an example of this kind of
self-regulation (Smith 1776, 312-313). Koppl (2018) refers to it as spontaneous order (10).
Makridakis and Taleb (2009) explain that the ability to forecast “fails when complex systems are
involved. Moreover, such a failure becomes more pronounced in complex social systems where
the actions and reactions of people can and do affect future outcomes” (843). Batistsky and
Domotor (2007) approach it more theoretically, saying that “stochastic models of chaotic
systems, while predictively [sic] successful in some cases, are in general predictively as limited
as deterministic ones” (79). Orrell and McSharry (2009) explain that it is impossible to model
complex systems using the kinds of direct mathematical laws used in fields like physics.
Equations in complex systems merely represent simplifications of reality. They are too easily
affected by outside forces and minor changes in the values of the input variables (738).
Gooyert and Größlerb (2018) indicate that distinguishing between applied and theoretical
system dynamics (SD) modeling and other forms of mathematical models can be helpful because
they each have their own research design decisions and different quality criteria. It is appropriate
to view applied SD as a response to the problem-owner who wishes to alter the current situation.
In this case, it is often necessary to follow all the steps of textbook SD to collect empirical data
on a specific situation and expand the system boundaries until considering all the hypothetical
variables that impact the system's behavior have. On the other hand, theoretical SD models are
often more oriented towards a small incremental step in a larger research agenda. It is often
challenging to develop a convincing theoretical contribution to the current scientific debate by
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mixing too many aspects in a fundamental modeling study. Therefore, theoretical SD studies do
not necessarily adhere to textbook paradigms, may not always collect empirical data, and may
have restrictive system boundaries that exclude some variables. Deciding which to use depends
upon the intended outcome of the project and the effectiveness of SD in achieving that outcome.
They point out that there are some overlaps whereby applied models can have theoretical
implications and vice versa. By pointing out how these two types of studies differ, they hope to
clarify the distinction and provide a framework for evaluating each type of study and related
publications.
Dodder and Dare (2000) report on the work of the Santa Fe Institute in 1987. They
explain that real-life economic systems had complex features that current approaches tended to
“assume away” (7). They say that the economists involved in the study recognized, for the first
time, that there was an essential difference between individual actors and the “aggregated
economic system that emerges from their interactions” and that these “interactions of these
heterogeneous agents lead them to self-organize into network-based structures that may never
settle into equilibrium (7). That lack of equilibrium means that the initial conditions are
constantly changing, and therefore the system is chaotic.
Kirman (2016) claims that the quest for economic equilibrium is a quixotic adventure. It
is quixotic because it is chaotic. The complex interactions between the various actors in the
economy are constantly evolving. Individuals change their minds, firms change their product
lines, and marketing strategies and institutions change their objectives and operating procedures.
As these interactions change, disrupting any existing equilibrium, they create a new stage forcing
the actors to accept changing roles (546). In his conclusion, he says that markets and the
economy are susceptible to unpredictable shifts in direction that may or may not result from
underlying fundamental changes (565). He does not say so, but this is analogous to
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acknowledging that predicting precisely when and where a tornado may spawn is impossible and
for much the same reasons.
Pascale, Millemann, and Gioja (2000) explain that as the understanding of complexity
theory has increased, recognition grows that organizations are living systems. They explain that
organizations have the same characteristics as any other living species, including creating,
propagating, and cooperating to achieve dominance in their environment. For example, species
that reproduce more rapidly than their competitors in nature gain a numerical advantage.
Organizations, like species, learn from their environment and change to meet it through the
efforts of their employees. This adaptation creates innovation which results in increased market
share.
The authors use case studies to draw parallels between nature and business to
demonstrate the similarities between organizations and living systems and point out the
advantages of this way of thinking. One of their examples is that of Cemex, the world’s thirdlargest cement company. Cemex cement truck drivers leave with their loads of cement with no
preordained destinations, much like ants scavenging for food, and like ants they have simple
goals, delivering as much cement as possible and avoiding duplicating the efforts of other trucks.
Using this emulation of living organisms, the company can promise to deliver cement where and
when customers want it on two hours’ notice. As a result, Cemex has bested the competition in
several major markets (185-6).

The Accuracy of Experts Using Models
Models may be mental or, more formally, mathematical, but both are subject to error. A
striking example of a failed mental model is the previously discussed, United States dietary
guidelines. Teicholz (2015) reports that according to an investigation by The British Medical
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Journal, the expert report underpinning the next set of US Dietary Guidelines for Americans fails
to incorporate relevant scientific research into its reviews of critical topics, which leads to wrong
conclusions. These omissions in the report suggest that the committee creating the report is
unwilling to consider any evidence that contradicts the recommendations made in the last thirtyfive years based on the original flawed mental model. As it has a significant impact on the diet of
Americans and that of most Western nations, the expert advice underpinning the US
government's dietary guidelines should consider all relevant scientific evidence, and it does not.
Experts, like everyone, tend to place too much confidence in their models. In comparing
expert predictions with novices, McBride Fidler and Burgman (2012) found that the experts,
while more often correct, dramatically overstated their confidence in their predictions.
Bang and Frith (2017) make a convincing case that the isolated decision-makers, such as
those found in government agencies, suffer from this overconfidence, and rarely make decisions
as efficiently and effectively as groups, such as those found in a free market. By way of example,
they point out that in the Wason selection task, a well-known logic problem where researchers
found that only 10 to 20% of individuals provided the correct response. In comparison, this
figure climbed to around 70% in groups. This evidence bolsters the conclusion that free markets
always perform better than planned markets since many people are involved.
Every motivated action is a prediction. This is true of all life capable of action. When an
organism acts, in doing so, it is predicting the outcome of that action. Lower life forms make
these predictions by instinct, while humans make them by reason. Humans believe that reason
will consistently outperform instinct, but evidence indicates that this might not be so. Tetlock
(2005) describes a Yale University experiment comparing a group of students’ ability to predict
with that of a Norwegian rat. The study involves a T-shaped maze with food placed at one end of
the T’s crossbar. The researchers randomly placed the food on one side or the other, but their
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process guaranteed that, on average, one side would have the food sixty percent of the time and
the other only forty. The rat did not take long to head for the sixty percent side almost every time
and therefore succeeded in finding food sixty percent of the time. Rather than using a statistical
method, which is essentially what the rat did, the students tried to find patterns that would allow
them to predict where the food was, which resulted in their predicting the correct side only fiftytwo percent of the time, slightly better than flipping a coin. Tetlock explains this, saying,
“Human performance suffers because we are, deep down, deterministic thinkers with an aversion
to probabilistic strategies that accept the inevitability of error. We insist on looking for order in
random sequences” (39-40).
This sort of thinking is not limited to funny stories about Yalies and rats; it can have
much more severe ramifications. Consider the case of the Space Shuttle Challenger; everyone by
now knows that failed O-rings caused the disaster during a much colder than typical launch.
However, Dalal, Fowlkes, and Hoadley (1989) present a more comprehensive view. Figure 7,
graph a, shows the data the NASA administration was looking at; it includes every case of a
previous O-ring problem. It does not appear from this data that O-ring failure is well correlated
with temperature. Like the Yalies in the previous example, the NASA administration thought
deterministically, looking for a pattern and seeing none, they drew a fatal conclusion.
On the other hand, Figure 7 (946), graph b, tells a different story. It includes the data
from all flights, not just those with O-ring failures, and it is clear that temperatures below sixtyfive degrees Fahrenheit have a far greater probability of failure than those above. If we were to
design a T-maze like the one above and put food in the above sixty-five-degree side eighty-four
percent of the time and in the below sixty-five-degree side one hundred percent of the time, the
rat would have chosen ‘do not launch’ (946).
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Figure 7

Athletes and musicians know that part of the purpose of training and practice is to make
performance intuitive. If one must think about what to do, performance will be inefficient. Part
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of the training is to develop an instinct, like the aforementioned rat. Most people have heard the
advice about taking multiple-choice tests; “if you do not know the answer, go with your gut, do
not think about it”. On the other hand, sometimes, this sort of thinking can lead us astray. For
example, teen drivers are, in part, more prone to accidents because their limited experience leads
them to conclude that performing a risky action a dozen times with no ill effects means that the
risky action is safe.
The lesson of all this is that people are not particularly good at predicting the future.
NASA got it wrong, and they ARE rocket scientists. Interestingly, rocket scientists may be less
prepared in some respects than is the average person. The rocket scientist training leads them to
use mathematical models to make predictions. If they had performed a linear regression on the
data in Figure 7, graph a, the resulting mathematical model would have shown a risk at thirty-one
degrees lower than at fifty degrees, and it would have resulted in a coefficient correlation of .1,
an indication that O-ring failure was not a function of temperature. The mathematics correctly
found an equation, F(failure) = 3.8 - .0343T(temperature), but that equation relied on an
inappropriate data set and provided an insufficient warning.
Current climate models are a good illustration. Anyone who claims to know what the
world temperature will be like at the end of this century is wrong. Green, Armstrong, and Soon
(2009) explain some of the many problems with current climate models. They explain that as
they examined ice-core data going back eight hundred thousand years, they found the changes
observed in the past century are part of a typical pattern. Their model has proven to be as
accurate in predicting past behavior as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change models.
However, going forward, their model predicts a future that does not include catastrophic climate
change but will probably continue to follow the historical patterns revealed in the ice-core
record. This century, the climate is unlikely to experience unusual climate change (831).
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Choosing who is right and wrong is impossible, but equally valid models producing opposite
answers is the salient point.
Blaufus, Bob, Lorenz, and Trink’s (2017) study reveals that experts fail to succeed in
financial matters. An investigation of German tax professionals working for either taxpayers or
the government revealed that laypeople were better at predicting how courts would rule on tax
issues than experts. According to the same study, the experts experienced significantly more
overconfidence in their predictions than laypeople.
Dror, Kukucka, Kassin, and Zapf (2018) make several important points, including that it
is critical not to confuse expert consensus and confidence with accuracy. They use several
examples of expert failure from forensic science. For example, they explain that DNA experts
often reach different conclusions from the same data, yet each of the different experts expresses
strong confidence in their findings. They also explain that the same expert often comes to
different conclusions using the same data but at two separate times.
Weather is an example of a system governed by non-linear dynamic interactions. It was
one of the first to be discovered and possibly the best example. Lorenz (1963) demonstrated that
the solutions under the influence of a ‘strange attractor’ are unstable. This instability tells us that
if one examines two points in the system arbitrarily close together, the two solutions calculated at
these points may be nearly identical for some time but then will begin to diverge in a manner that
creates two vastly different results. The length of time required for this to occur depends upon
the initial proximity of the two initial states. These circumstances define a state of chaos in
which complex systems become independent of their initial conditions. In this state, they are
continuously unstable and can easily be altered by what one might otherwise think of as
insignificant events. Systems in this state are utterly unpredictable over more extended periods
no matter how well the system is understood because it is sensitive to the initial conditions of
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which the system has become independent. No matter how well one measures the initial
conditions, the system itself will create a new set of initial conditions after a time. Lorenz (1972)
follows up on this, saying that it does not appear to be possible “Regardless of what any
theoretical study may imply” to provide, “conclusive proof that good day-to-day forecasts can be
made at a range of two weeks or more” (2). The title of this presentation before the American
Association for the Advancement of Science is the now famous quote, “Predictability: Does the
Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” Put simply; weather forecasts
are about as good as they are ever going to get.
All these complex systems, like the weather, are such that the best we can do is to
essentially extrapolate past patterns into the future, hoping there will be continuity, at least in the
short run. Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba (2010) tell us that while the future may resemble the
past, the future will not be the same as the past (84). They conclude in their study that expert
forecasters did not demonstrate superior ability to make successful predictions compared to
"knowledgeable individuals" (795). Likewise, McBride Fidler and Burgman (2012) conclude
that "expert status is a poor guide to good performance" (789).

The Accuracy of Experts Using Models in Economic Forecasting
Hofman, Sharma, and Watts (2017) discuss the predictability of human behavior. They
find that it is possible to make trivial statistical predictions if one states the limits of their
accuracy. The authors explain that non-trivial but far less accurate forecasts such as those
involving stock market movements or presidential elections can be somewhat accurate a week or
so in advance but are more like gambling than calculating the earth’s position in orbit. Finally,
they address black swans, rare, unpredictable events with far-reaching results. Since predicting
these events is impossible, they can create tidal change in every area of human endeavor. Models
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can help us understand phenomenon but are not effective at forecasting. They close by saying,
“Properly understood, in other words, prediction and explanation should be viewed as
complements, not substitutes, in the pursuit of social scientific knowledge” (488).
According to Koppl, Kauffman, Felin, and Longo (2015), economic evolution is unstable
and therefore does not have any entailing laws that govern its dynamics. As a result, economic
dynamics are not causal, and the economy is a creative phenomenon. Economic dynamics are
creative, and as such, the implicit framework of analysis for the economic landscape changes in
ways that cannot be predicted using algorithmic methods or based upon fixed rules. An
econosphere characterized by start-ups, politics, and social entrepreneurship solves the frame
problem. The course of economic evolution is not predictable, and the number of traded things,
for which they use the term “cambiodiversity,” increases as time progresses. The metatheoretical
framework described by this paper describes how all the diverse actors interact to achieve what
they refer to as ‘novelty intermediation.’ To illustrate innovation intermediation, they offer
examples from the Renaissance in Italy to Silicon Valley. The authors provide no automatic
policy prescriptions because of the framework’s main negative result. However, it may lead
toward a new economic system that is more appropriate for a creative society.
Tacchella, Mazzilli, and Pietronero (2018) argue that the economic modeling of gross
domestic product requires a fundamental rethinking that is more scientific and less dogmatic.
Many make attempts to achieve this through economic complexity. They explain how lowdimensional representations can effectively forecast growth and affect our general thinking about
the driving forces of economic growth and the characteristics of economic development.
According to them, economic complexity is a universal phenomenon that implies a more solid
and more profound correlation between economic complexity and macroeconomics. Finally, they
argue that there is considerable room for improvement regarding integrating economic
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complexity and dynamical systems into conventional macroeconomics. In their opinion, it may
be possible to improve the accuracy and the understanding of economic growth and
development.
Taleb (202) explains the difference between binary forecasts, that an event will either
happen or not happen, or if a metric will go up or down in each time frame, and the real-world
payoff, benefit, or harm, caused by the event. He says that using one as a proxy for the other
occurs too frequently, particularly in economic circles. Thus, this use of one to indicate the other
is unwarranted and unsound. He concludes by saying, “If a mistake doesn’t cost you anything –
or helps you survive or improve your outcomes– it is clearly not a mistake. And if it costs you
something and has been present in society for a long time, consider that there may be hidden
evolutionary advantages to these types of mistakes –of the following sort: mistaking a bear for a
stone is worse than mistaking a stone for a bear” (1239).
A national economy is a non-linear dynamic system of the same type as the weather and
is equally impossible to forecast beyond the short term. Fair (2011) puts it this way, “The results
thus suggest that the degree of uncertainty of any particular forecast of the macroeconomy that
one can never eliminate is large. Any forecast is based implicitly or explicitly on assumptions
about asset price changes, which one has no ability to forecast” (107). This is reinforced by
Kuttner (1999) who says, “In recent decades, economists at both ends of the spectrum, as well as
those in the middle, have had one thing in common: Most have been profoundly wrong about the
economy” (23).
Makridakis and Taleb (2009) explain that based upon a massive body of research, we can
conclude that reality teaches us that accurate forecasting is not possible. Furthermore, we cannot
assess the level of uncertainty and that empirical evidence covering decades shows “the
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disastrous consequences of inaccurate forecasts in areas ranging from the economy and business
to floods and medicine” (716).
By way of support for this contention, we examine the Federal Reserve of the United
States (the Fed) attempts to forecast economic conditions in the United States. Edge, Kiley, and
LaForte (2010) performed a systematic analysis of the performance of the Fed staff and other
forecasters and found that none of them were in close agreement and none of them produced
results accurate enough to facilitate making economic policy even as far in advance as within the
current month (745-747). Frendreis and Tatalovich (2000) compared the economic forecasts of
the Administration’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO), and the Fed from 1979 to 1997 for GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment and
found that the mean absolute error of one group’s predictions was often more than double,
occasionally approaching triple, one of the other group’s (627). In addition, the mean absolute
error for GDP Growth varied from 1.89 to .78 during a period when real GDP growth typically
varied between -2 and positive 4 percent. An error of almost two in a range of six is large enough
to render it useless as a policy-making tool (627). The fact that the three groups often could not
even agree on the basics exacerbates this error, for example, the CBO making an optimistic
forecast while the Fed was making a pessimistic forecast (627).
Jansen and Kishan (1996) studied the accuracy, reliability, and efficiency of Fed's
forecasting and concluded that "Over the entire sample period, the Fed's forecasts of current
quarter unemployment, current quarter output growth, and the one-quarter-ahead unemployment
rate are biased. This bias means that the Fed made systematic forecasting errors" (107).
Joutz and Stekler (2000) also studied the accuracy of the Fed's forecasts and reached
similar conclusions. Their data show that even within the current quarter, the forecasts are
consistently not reliable enough to guide creating sound economic policy. Forecasts three and
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four quarters out are beyond worthless. Even one quarter ahead, the general direction of GDP
was not being forecast with sufficient accuracy to be of use (36).
Tulip reports that while the FOMC's approach has improved for short horizons, longhorizon errors have increased. He says that the more basic difficulty is that a previously relied
upon, a predictable portion of economic variations no longer exists (1229).
Gaeto and Mazumder conclude that the FED chairs forecasting accuracy has steadily
declined since 1997. They say explicitly that,” This demonstrates that Fed chairs have gotten
worse with their public predictions about growth, inflation, and unemployment over this period
(1997-2015), less specific with their forecasts, or indeed both at the same time” (982).

The Accuracy of Experts Using Models Worsened by Asset Bubbles
Bubbles can further show government failure to forecast well enough to act helpfully.
These bubbles or boom and bust cycles are a frequent cause of tough economic times.
Speculative frenzy, failed government monetary policies, or both typically cause these
challenging times. The majority opinion seems to be that the cause of these challenging times is
speculative frenzy but often exacerbated by failed government monetary policy. These bubbles
result from the desire to get rich quickly, rent-seeking, and are of no benefit to the economy.
Real economic growth requires real growth in value and takes time because real value does not
change rapidly. Quinn and Turner (2020) explain that. “Bubbles can encourage overinvestment,
overemployment [sic] and overbuilding, which ends up being inefficient for both businesses and
society.” They go on to add that, “The most severe economic effects usually occur when the
bursting of a bubble reduces the value of collateral backing bank loans. This value reduction,
coupled with the inability of bubble investors to repay loans, can result in a banking crisis (2).
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The past four hundred years have seen dozens of asset bubbles. The first welldocumented one was the Tulipmania Bubble, a speculative bubble in tulip bulbs taking place in
the Netherlands from 1634 to 1637. After importation, the tulip’s novelty, beauty, and scarcity
suddenly caused tulips to become very desirable. Tulips can be planted and produce more bulbs
and seeds over several years, which led many to think of tulips as a sound economic investment
(Chang et al., 2016, 498). As tulip prices rose, speculators began buying bulbs for the sole
purpose of reselling them a short while later at a significant profit, that is, “flipping” them
(Mackay 2013, 1586-1751). A market in futures contracts developed because it takes time for
bulbs to beget more bulbs. A default on one of these contracts was the proximate cause of the
bubble bursting and led the tulip bulb market to dramatically crash as buyers left the market and
sellers were desperate. As a result, contracts stopped being honored, destroying confidence in the
tulip bulb market. The government attempted to help assuage the tulip market meltdown by
honoring contracts at ten percent of their face value, which caused the market to plunge even
further. The catastrophic popping of the tulip bulb bubble brought an end to the Dutch Golden
Age and began an economic depression that lasted for several years (Hayes 2019).
The next example, the South Sea Bubble, occurred in the early 18th century and revolved
around the shares of the South Sea Company, a British international trading company. The
company obtained a monopoly in trade pursuant to a treaty made following the War of the
Spanish Succession. Anticipating extensive profits from trade with the gold and silver-rich South
American colonies led speculators to bid the South Sea Company’s shares to levels far beyond
actual value (Mackay 2013, 1786-1941). It was not long before virtually all segments of society
were engaged in rampant stock speculation. The stock price was £128 in January of 1720
(Carswell, 1960). It rapidly rose to £1000 per share by August 1720 (Kleer 2015, 276). The
South Sea Bubble finally burst, and stock prices completely collapsed to £150 per share in
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September 1720 (Carswell, 1960). The behavior of South Sea stock was typical of most bubbles,
with a rapid rise and an even faster decline (Temin and Voth 2004, 1658).
Frehen, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2013) describe the result this way, “The crash in
the equity markets in 1720 was a significant setback for financing of enterprise. The success of
the public insurance corporation depended on the external demand for shares and the availability
of public investment capital. These dried up with the global contraction of securities markets
following the crash in Great Britain” (596).
The next bubble occurred contemporaneously with the South Sea Bubble and was called
the Mississippi Bubble in France. It began with the French government bordering on insolvency
primarily due to debts incurred during the War of Spanish Succession. The French government
defaulted on segments of its debt, cut interest payments, and raised taxes which had the effect of
severely depressing the French economy and induced wild fluctuations in the value of its gold
and silver-backed currency.
John Law (1705) had published an academic tract, Money and Trade Considered, in
which he presented theories advocating the forerunner of the central bank, saying, "Sovereign
authority … is necessary to save men from doing themselves mischief" (Pollard 1953, 623). He
argued against using gold or silver to back currency and suggested instead using paper money or
fiat currency. He theorized that this would stimulate commerce (Garber 1990, 41). When the
French government sought his advice, he saw this as an opportunity to test his monetary theory.
The resulting bubble "was inherently political, engineered by John Law in an unsuccessful
attempt to reduce the French government's debt burden” (Quinn and Turner 2020, 9). Law was
permitted in 1716 to create a national bank, the Banque Générale. The Banque Générale built up
its reserves by issuing stock and earning profit by handling the French government's finances
(Garber 190, 41).
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Law purchased the Mississippi Company in 1717 and received a trade monopoly to
develop France’s North American colonies all along the Mississippi River. In July 1719, the
Company purchased the right to mint new coinage. In August, it bought the right to collect all
French indirect taxes, and in October, it took over the collection of direct taxes. “Finally, a plan
was launched to restructure most of the national debt, whereby the remainder of existing
government debt would be exchanged for Compagnie [Company] shares” (Garber 190, 43). Law
had amassed an incredible amount of power through this cronyism as his companies now
controlled both France’s foreign trade and its finances.
From January to December of 1719, the Company’s public shares went from five
hundred livres per share to 10,000 livres per share. As with the South Sea Bubble, people of all
social classes speculated in Compagnie des Indes shares. In January 1720, company shares began
to fall as astute investors realized that earnings could not provide the promised dividends and
began to take their profits in gold coins. Law tried to curb the sell-off by printing more money
and limiting payments in gold to one hundred livres (Vogel 2010, 31). Nevertheless, Law’s
devaluations and the sell-off caused Company shares to collapse from 10,000 livres to 1,000
livres by December 1720 (Vogel 2010, 31). Share prices continued to fall, reaching five hundred
livres in 1721 (Moen, 2001). The collapse Mississippi Bubble at about the same time that
Britain’s South Sea Bubble burst plunged France and much of Europe into an economic
depression so severe that it created the conditions that eventually led to the French Revolution
fifty years later (Moen, 2001).
This scenario repeats repeatedly over the next four hundred years. A sample of the
lengthy list includes The British Railway Mania Bubble 1844-1846, America’s Stock Market
Bubble 1929, Kuwait’s Souk al-Manakh Stock Bubble, America’s Stock Market Bubble 1987,
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Japan’s Bubble Economy 1980s, the Dot.com Bubble, and the American housing bubble in
2007-2008.
Economic bubbles “command enormous attention, yet there is little consensus about their
causes and identification of the main characteristics” that might allow intervention to dampen
their growth or results (Girdzijauskas et al., 2009, 268). Quinn and Turner (2020) use the
analogy of a fire triangle to explain what causes bubbles to ‘burn’. They label the three sides of
the bubble triangle as marketability, money and credit, and speculation.
Vijayan (2008) discusses the 2008 bubble-busting saying that while greed and lack of
appropriate regulatory oversight get much of the blame for meltdown, there was also an
information technology failure. Further, he asserts that an overreliance on models that failed to
predict the risks associated with the recently introduced financial investments was also a
significant factor (8).
Rodrigue (2020) has presented the most widely distributed investigation of bubbles or
boom and bust cycles. He points out that bubbles often begin due to innovation of some sort,
usually technological or financial. He identifies four phases in the Boom-and-bust cycle: stealth,
awareness, mania, and blow-off (Chapter 3).
In the stealth phase, the ‘smart money’ recognizes a developing opportunity that entails
some risk in an unproven venture, but that holds promise for substantial appreciation in the
future. Although these investors are not planning to ‘make a killing’ and sell out, their analysis
indicates that excellent returns are possible in the long term and are investing on that basis
(chapter 3).
In the awareness phase, other investors notice the indications that the smart money had
seen earlier, and institutional investors start putting in more money driving the price higher
(2020, chapter 3).
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One characterization of the mania phase is the media touting the asset and the speculators
and members of the public beginning to buy. These folks are looking for what Rodrigue (2020)
calls “the opportunity of a lifetime” (chapter 3). However, these new buyers are not ‘investors,’
as they generally ignore the fundamental value and merely base their enthusiasm on the increase
in the assets price. Put plainer, this phase has nothing to do with logical investing and everything
to do with rent-seeking, causing the price of the asset to rise to levels utterly unsupported by the
fundamentals.
In the blow-off phase, it all comes tumbling down (Rodrigue 2020). This phase sees the
price fall far faster than its movement on the way up (chapter 3).
It is common to hunt about for economic reasons for these bubbles, but the reasons are
not economic; they result from rent-seeking. It may be that central banks exacerbate the problem
by loosening or failing to tighten credit, but these central banks are incapable of forecasting
trends with sufficient accuracy to make this possible (Cardell 2021). This behavior constitutes a
notable exception to Adam Smith’s (1776) dictum that persons in the market operate in an
informed way they always act in their genuine best interest. Chang et al. (2016) show that “when
hype and speculative investment surrounds a company or market sector, the findings in this
chapter suggest that investors may be willing to reduce due diligence and take unmeasured risks
in sectors with which they lack experience” (505). Hageback (2017) says Jung gave new insight
into how humanity makes decisions by introducing archetypes. Scientists have confirmed that a
sizable portion of information gathering, and decision-making is unconscious. A Jungian
archetypal activation intends to maintain the psychological equilibrium of an individual, which
might lead to irrational paths for the population. Hageback explains that viewing seemingly
irrational behavior from a holistic viewpoint as a function of law-bound logic that repeatedly and
predictably recurs throughout history is indicated. He proposes the use of big data and the in-
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depth analysis of symbols as representations of archetypes to produce time series that replicate
this unconscious thinking and assist in determining whether archetypes play a significant role in
the formation of financial bubbles.

The Accuracy of Experts Using Models Worsened by Black Swans
Burdekin (2020) analyzes the economic and financial effects of the 1918-1919 Spanish
Flu pandemic. Figure 8 below shows the extent of the pandemic (Census Bureau 1918 and
1919).
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Figure 9, below, shows some of the economic effects. Note the ‘ragged’ shape of graph
of the M1 money supply in the center area at the peak of the pandemic as well as the erratic
behavior in the consumer price index at the same time. Much like events in the 2020-2021
Corvid 19 pandemic, there were worldwide supply chain disruptions that magnified the
economic effect. He concludes that “Combining US data with nine European countries for which
both monthly death and stock market data are available for 1918-1919; the empirical results
show the deaths variable to be statistically significant with the expected negative sign” (3).
Correia, Luck, and Verner (2020) explain that the non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPI) were milder than those imposed by some countries in Europe during the COVID-19
pandemic and that these milder NPIs did not seem to exacerbate the economic problems.
However, they say that more severe measures, including business closures, increase the
economic cost of NPIs (16).

US Monthly M1 Money Supply vs. Consumer Price Index, 1915-1921.

Figure 9
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Barro, Ursúa, and Weng indicate that the evidence thus far does not indicate that the
COVID-19 pandemic will have a more significant effect than the Spanish Flu pandemic. They
say that “In effect, countries have been pursuing a policy of lowering real GDP—particularly as
it relates to travel and commerce—as a way of curbing the spread of the disease. There is clearly
a difficult tradeoff here concerning lives versus material goods, with little ongoing discussion
about how this tradeoff should be assessed and acted upon” (18). Gordon (2020) says that the
COVID-19 pandemic is likely to do greater economic damage than the Spanish Flu pandemic
(54).

Solutions Suggested in the Literature
It is essential to find solutions that eliminate or mitigate these bubbles as they can have
devastating effects. “In extreme cases, such radical changes in financial and economic conditions
may give rise to social upheaval and political instability (Thorton 2004, 24). Chang et al. (2016)
conclude that “All the economic bubbles have reflected that risk management, guidelines, and
analysis are essential” but usually ignored (505).
Virtually every source available that offers a solution describes methods for using
monetary policy to solve the problem of bubbles instead of finding ways to address rent-seeking.
For example, Schwartz (2009) explains the 2008 housing bubble this way:
It has become a cliché to refer to the asset boom as a mania. The cliché, however,
obscures why ordinary folk become avid buyers of whatever object has become the target
of desire. An asset boom is propagated by an expansive monetary policy that lowers
interest rates and induces borrowing beyond prudent bounds to acquire the asset. The Fed
was accommodative too long from 2001 on and was slow to tighten monetary policy,
delaying tightening until June 2004 and then ending the monthly 25 basis point increase
in August 2006 (19).
"The Austrian economists agree. Austrian business cycle theory is based on Austrian
capital theory and posits that we alter the rate of interest produced by the free market at our
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peril" (McDonald and Stokes 2013, 439). Aliber and Kindleberger (2015) agree that economic
booms and their ultimate collapse were to some extent made possible by loose credit (340).
Surowiecki (2014), speaking of the 2007 recession, says, "lots of people who were supposedly
very smart took lots of very foolish risks, betting borrowed billions on dubious mortgage
derivatives" (17).
Horowitz (2012) addresses boom and bust cycles both within the context of the Great
Recession (GR) and in general. He says that many have alleged that the GR and such cycles, in
general, result from deregulation or lack of regulation and therefore indicate fundamental faults
in the capitalist system. Furthermore, he says that if these critics looked more closely, they would
see that "misguided government policy" caused the GR rather than fundamental problems with
the free market. These policies created the unsustainable boom that led to a crash (65). He
documents the details of his assertion and concludes that the government policies created a series
of micro-economic failures caused by the misallocation of resources that resulted from those
policies (67). In his conclusion, he says that "it was a classic example of the undesirable
unintended consequences of government intervention, both through expansionary monetary
policy and misguided attempts to bolster the housing market" (68).
Taylor (2014) presents an analysis that comes to many of the same conclusions as
Horowitz. First, he explains that the recession and the slow recovery have caused economic
instability to more than triple. Taylor supports this by citing the increase in the standard
deviation of the percentage gap between real GDP and potential GDP from one-and-one-half
percent for the twenty years preceding the recession to five and one-half percent in the five years
following the recession. While he does not blame government policy outright, he says that
"policy should at least be on the list of possible causes of the crisis and severity of the recession"
(61). Finally, he says that considering policy as the cause is justified due to changes in monetary

61

policy, regulatory policy, and fiscal policy, "each becoming more discretionary, more
interventionist, and less predictable" in the period leading up to the GR [Great Recession] (61).
Some seem to indicate the futility of government 'fixing' bubbles. "It has important
implications for the way we think about policy responses to downturns. If a downturn originates
in a negative productivity shock that tightens credit constraints, the government might have little
to do unless it has an advantage in lending vis-à-vis the private sector. But if a downturn
originates in a negative investor sentiment shock that bursts a bubble, the government might
have an important role to play in coordinating expectations and taking the economy back to the
bubbly equilibrium" (Carvalho, Martin, and Ventura 2012, 99-100).
“Needless to say, the conclusions should not be taken at face value when it comes to
designing actual policies. This is so because the model may not provide an accurate
representation of the challenges facing actual policy makers” (Gali 2014, 746).
Stockman (2013) quotes Greenspan before the Senate Finance Committee, saying, “That
presupposes I know that there is a bubble … I don’t think we can know there has been a bubble
until after the fact. To assume we know it currently presupposes that we have the capacity to
forecast an imminent decline in [stock] prices” (358).
“Though in the long-term perspective any new market or new technology would cause
another bubble to grow, there are no other ways for economy to develop just through the cyclic
process” (Girdzijauskas et al. 2009, 278).
Some scholars hint at possibilities, “Because asset bubbles are a symptom of financial
frictions, a policy that cures the root cause of inefficiency and instability should be proposed”
(Kunieda and Shibata 2016, 83). Taleb and Martin (2012) address the ‘Great Recession’
following the busting of the housing bubble in 2007-2008. They conclude that preventing future
problems revolving around firms that are too big to fail and government intervention requires
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‘skin in the game.’ By this, they mean extreme accountability. They explain that Hammurabi’s
code used this principle even in ancient times. They quote from it, “If a builder builds a house for
a man and does not make its construction firm, and the house which he has built collapses and
causes the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be put to death” (50). They are not
suggesting summary executions, but we must find ways to hold all actors accountable for their
words and deeds.
Other scholars suggest other solutions; “Theoretical results and numerical exercises
suggest that a small trading tax may be effective in reducing speculative trading, but it may not
be very effective in reducing price volatility or the size of the bubble” (Scheinkman and Xiong
2003, 1208).
All the above proposals suggest methods, most of which have been tried and failed, failed
because they approach the problem from the wrong direction. The only way to prevent a bubble
is to address the root cause, which we have established is rent-seeking. It is impossible to prevent
rent-seeking itself; Jeremiah 6:13 tells us that “For from the least to the greatest of them,
everyone is greedy for unjust gain; and from prophet to priest, everyone deals falsely.” Since the
problem is not caused by ‘legitimate’ investing, and since we will never eliminate human greed,
we must find a solution that addresses rent-seeking directly. The only way to eliminate the
effects of rent-seeking is to eliminate the possibility of profiting from that rent-seeking.

Conclusion of Literature Review
This literature review has found compelling evidence that Hayek was correct in his
assertion that "what cannot be known cannot be planned" (Hayek 1988, 84). It has examined the
previous research surrounding whether an economy, planned by experts, can result in greater
economic good than can be achieved by spontaneous order created by the combination of
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individual choices that make up the free market? It has concluded that the self-regulating system
that is the free market will always produce greater good than can any centrally planned system.
This conclusion leads to the question of the government's role in economic affairs. Of course, the
most critical role is to protect property rights and maintain a level playing field free of corruption
and cronyism. Nevertheless, as the recent pandemic has shown, there is also a role for
government to prepare for black swans, unforeseen disasters that harm the economy.
In our daily lives, most of us acknowledge the unknowable nature of the future. We buy
car insurance, home insurance, life insurance, and medical insurance. In doing this, we
acknowledge that it is better to be prepared for unforeseen events than to try to predict them.
Public policy should follow the same course; let the free market do what it does but prepare for
what might happen if and when things go wrong. Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba (2010) explain
that from their research, "the key is not to develop precise plans based on predictions, but to have
emergency plans for a variety of possibilities" (89). Government economic policy should be
more like FEMA than the Federal Reserve. That is what the citizens do; government should heed
their wisdom.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

The current pressure from some constituencies to transition the United States toward a
centrally planned economy (CPE) makes it valuable to question whether a CPE can result in
greater economic good than can be achieved by spontaneous order, as is created by the
combination of individual choices that make up the free market. Furthermore, the repeated
failures of CPEs may indicate that fundamental socio-economic principles prevent their success.
For example, Hayek (1988) postulated that the forecasting necessary to a CPE is impossible;
hence, effective planning is impossible (84). Therefore, this paper will ask the research question:
Is it possible to forecast economic variables with sufficient accuracy to make a centrally planned
economy more successful than a free market? The answer to this question is essential to the
public and policymakers in determining the nation's course.
This chapter will describe the methods used to answer the research question. The
pattern used in the first two chapters will be continued here, that is, there will be separate
methods for each of the three domains as well as for the aggregation of the three domains. The
three domains that affect economic forecasting are: the accuracy of mathematical modeling in
forecasting economic trends in the presence of chaos, the prediction, and control of asset
bubbles, also called boom and bust cycles, and the effect of unpredictable "black swan" events.
Reliable sources in each of the three domains were presented in Chapter II, but no sources were
found that addressed the combined effect of these three domains on economic forecasting. This
chapter will build on the evidence presented in these three domains and then combine the results
from all three to answer the research question.
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Methodology of the First Domain: Chaos
In the first domain, the existing studies have already shown that forecasting the most
commonly investigated economic variables is not accurate enough to guarantee sound policy
decision-making. These investigations have included gross domestic product (GDP),
unemployment rate, and inflation rate. For example, Frendreis and Tatalovich (2000) found in
their study of GDP that the average errors ranged from eight out of sixty to nineteen out of sixty,
thirteen to thirty-two percent (630).
While these studies are of some benefit in answering the research question, they are not
enough since the government would control these variables in a CPE. Therefore, it became
necessary to seek a new measure beyond government control and analyze that variable. The
variable chosen is real personal consumption expenditures, a measure of aggregate personal
consumption expenditures by all individual consumers. This variable is usually abbreviated PCE,
but to eliminate confusion with the already used abbreviation, CPE, the variable will be
abbreviated gRPCE. This collection includes thirty years of the Federal Reserve staff forecasts of
real personal consumption expenditures (gRPCEs) and comparing the projections with the
results. Finally, all that remains in this step is to report the results broken down by magnitude,
direction, and total errors when the described quantitative analyses are complete.
After examining the results of the quantitative analyses of the gRPCE, the next step was
to justify those results theoretically. This step will explain the results first as if the economic
environment was simple and then explain them in the complex, chaotic environment that is the
economic reality. The separation is necessary because most forecasting tools assume a noncomplex economic environment, so it is necessary to investigate that possibility even though the
evidence indicates the assumption is faulty. Chaotic environments exist when a vast number of
autonomous or semi-autonomous actors are each capable of influencing the behavior of other
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actors in the system. The weather is a prime example of such a system. Weather is created by the
interactions of air, water, and surface molecules, all affecting the behavior of other molecules,
which affect the behavior of still others, in an infinite set of feedback loops. Economics is also a
chaotic system. Economics today is comprised of a worldwide market of about eight billion
people. Each of these eight billion has the potential to influence millions of others, and many do.
As a chaotic system, one would expect accurate forecasting to be impossible. Aggregated
evidence from previous studies will show that this is born out in attempts at economic
forecasting.
System dynamics models were created in Vensim and provide a possible explanation for
the existing inaccuracy. These models will present possible explanations for the observed chaos
within the system and evaluate the possibility of finding mechanisms to mitigate the chaos. The
models also illustrate how this chaotic behavior occurs and using multiple runs with slightly
altered parameters will show how divergent the results can be. These models may clarify the
theoretical impossibility of predicting the economy any helpful distance in advance. Just as
Lorenz’s (1963) first weather model was less complex than the reality, the models created of the
economy will also be simple; however, even in the simple form, it will generate radically
unpredictable behavior (130). The models will establish the relationship between the variations
of the collective desire of humanity to improve GDP and the variations in GDP, such as standard
of living, which is complex in itself since the difference between desired GDP and actual GDP
produces changes in the collective desire. These changes, in turn, modify the difference between
the desired state and the actual state. Of course, all this is contingent on the properties of the
economic system, such as resistance to change, change propagation, and other factors that
collectively become parameters in the models.
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Finally, the sum of the evidence will show whether the cause of forecasting errors is
inadequate methods that will improve in the future or if the environment is sufficiently chaotic to
eliminate the possibility of substantially increased accuracy. These steps conclude the
independent analysis of the first domain. Once the analysis of the first domain is complete, the
paper will present practical solutions to any uncovered deficiencies that may involve reducing
dependency on forecasting. These solutions may require decreased use of monetary policy as the
primary tool and replacing it with changes in fiscal policy that allow the market greater freedom
to regulate itself. That completes the independent analysis of the first domain.

Methodology of the Second Domain: Bubbles
The second domain, the study of asset value overshoot and collapse, often called
"bubbles" or "boom and bust" cycles, is the study of the historical record of these events to find a
typical pattern. While the historical record is rich with descriptions of many, if not all, of these
asset bubbles, there appears to be only one attempt to study them as a collection, and it does not
include the most recent examples (Rodrique 2020, chapter 3). However, the existing evidence
suggests a typical pattern, and if matching more current examples to this pattern or a
modification of this pattern proves successful, further analysis becomes possible.
The analysis of the second domain begins with a study of the history of asset price
bubbles or boom and bust cycles. As in the first domain, once discovering a pattern, the next step
will be to interpret the data by preparing a system dynamics model that mimics the composite
behavior of the asset bubbles to present a possible theoretical reason for the existence of these
bubbles. This theoretical explanation will allow an evaluation of the forecastability and
moderation or prevention of these bubbles.
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The history of several historical bubbles, including the first three, the Tulipmania bubble,
the South Sea bubble, and the Mississippi bubble, was collected. A random selection of
subsequent bubbles followed these three; the DJIA from 1928 to 1930, the S&P 500 in 1986 and
1987, the Nikkei 225 from 1987 thru 1991, the Nasdaq 100 from 1994 thru 2003, the Tesla stock
bubble in 2014 and 2015, and the Bitcoin bubble in 2017 and 2018. The commonalities of these
bubbles were then analyzed and compared with the results obtained by Rodrigue. Rodrigue’s
(2020) results show a striking similarity among these bubbles and display the same general
pattern (chapter 3). This general pattern suggests that they may be slightly different
manifestations of a common cause. The compared histories indicate that widespread speculation
by many in the general population, not accustomed to asset investment and hoping to make a
quick profit, is a primary precipitating factor. These asset bubbles have proven to be exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to predict and control. Unfortunately, these bubbles are also the
proximal cause of many of the worst economic downturns in human history, and no economic
policy is complete without a plan to address them.
Constructing a system dynamics model to present a possible set of relationships that
could explain the behavior of these bubbles may provide a path toward a solution. Once
completed and run, if the model generates behavior that favorably compares with historical
norms finding such a solution should be possible. All historical attempts to remedy these bubbles
have been by adjusting monetary policy, and all have failed and often made the situation worse.
This conclusion will lead to a new solution consisting of a tax designed to eliminate profits
derived from short-term speculation and reward long-term investment. As with the proposed
solutions in the first domain, this solution moves the policy from the monetary policy arena into
the realm of fiscal policy. That will conclude the independent analysis of the second domain.
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Methodology of the Third Domain: Black Swans
The analysis of the third domain begins with background information. 'Black swans' are
statistically unlikely events that occur at infrequent intervals. Taleb (2007) says, "We are now
subjected to the classical problem of induction: making bold claims about the unknown based on
assumed properties of the known" (198). He refers to studying relatively recent events and
projecting the observed behavior into a much broader arena. These assumed properties, gleaned
from these limited examples of the known, he refers to are an ongoing problem in many policy
areas. He uses the example of a 200-year flood. Flood records typically cover periods long
enough to include 100-year floods but do not have the scope to include 200-year floods.
Therefore, we cannot know of the existence of 200-year floods, or for that matter, 500-year
floods or millennial floods, and we cannot predict what damage they might do. Taleb (2007)
coined the phrase black swan events to refer to them (198).
Makridakis and Taleb (2009) follow up by saying that based upon a large body of
evidence; the conclusion is that reality shows that accurate forecasting is impossible.
Furthermore, it is not even possible to assess the level of uncertainty and that historical studies
covering almost a century show "the disastrous consequences of inaccurate forecasts in areas
ranging from the economy and business to floods and medicine" (716).
According to Marani, Katul, Pan, and Parolari (2021), based on historical information,
estimates of the likelihood of intense epidemics are unreliable or nonexistent. They present an
analysis of epidemic trends and patterns spanning four centuries. Epidemic intensity has a
constant probability distribution with a slowly decaying algebraic tail, suggesting that severe
epidemics are less likely as the epidemic intensity increases. This result suggests, together with
recent estimates of disease emergence from animal reservoirs associated with environmental
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change, a high probability of observing pandemics like COVID-19 (lifetime probability of
experiencing it currently at 38%), which may double in the next decade.
The third domain, black swan events (BSEs), requires a somewhat different approach
than the first two domains. Taleb (2010) coined the term "black swan" to describe sporadic
events that will occur. He lists three attributes of a black swan:
1. It is an unpredictable outlier.
2. It has an extreme impact.
3. Explanations made after the fact will attempt to make it appear predictable.
He lists examples including World War I, the rise of the personal computer, the spread of
the internet, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the 9/11 terrorist
attacks (15).
Since these events are, by definition, unpredictable, rather than focusing on forecasting, it
is more reasonable to focus on the response. In this vein, it is reasonable to seek evidence to
indicate whether a CPE or a free market economy (FME) can better respond to BSEs. Since no
historical evidence allows the direct comparison of CPE and FME response to the same BSE, it
will be necessary to use alternative methods. One way to do this is to examine the governments'
(federal, state, and local) response to the recent COVID-19 pandemic and evaluate the success or
failure of the government in mitigating the economic harm induced by that pandemic. To
accomplish this, we will compare data published by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System on the economic fallout generated by the governments' response to the
pandemic. Evaluating this economic data in the light of medical evidence regarding the public
health effects of the governments' response allows a judgment about the correctness of the
governments' response. For example, a finding that the economic harm produced was minimal
compared to the public health good achieved, leads to a conclusion that the governments'
response was successful; however, if the economic harm produced was severe and the public
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health effects minimal, it would be reasonable to conclude that the governments' response was a
failure. Either way, we can examine whether the response was more like a response expected
from a CPE or closer to that of an FME.

Methodology of the Combined Domains
After analyzing the three domains separately, it will be possible to assemble them into a
coherent whole. This combination of the three domains is essential since considering the
combination is necessary to forecast an economy any helpful distance into the future. Moreover,
this assemblage allows the interpretation of the whole to answer the research question: whether a
CPE can result in greater economic good than can be achieved by spontaneous order, as is
created by the combination of individual choices that make up the free market.
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CHAPTER IV: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Results in the First Domain: Chaos
Discovering Economic Chaos
While the results of the studies Federal Reserve forecasting accuracy described above are
of some benefit in answering the research question, they are not enough since, in a CPE, the
control of these variables would reside with the government. Therefore, it was necessary to seek
a new measure beyond government control and analyze the forecasting accuracy of that variable.
The variable chosen is the growth in real personal consumption expenditures quarter over quarter
(gRPCE), which measures aggregate personal consumption expenditures by all individual
consumers. It is derived from a broad collection of products and services purchased by
individuals in the United States. The following is the official description of the data set used,
"Several data sets contain the projections from the Greenbooks of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors. The Greenbook is produced before each meeting of the Federal Open Market
Committee. Using an assumption about monetary policy, the Research staff at the Board of
Governors prepares projections about how the economy will fare in the future. These projections
are made available to the public after a lag of five years." (Federal Reserve Staff, 2020).
The graph below, Figure 10, displays the percent error in the forecast made each quarter
for the same quarter one year ahead. This analysis examines thirty years of Federal Reserve
forecasts of gRPCEs and compares the projections with the results.
The data collected covers the forecasts from the first quarter of 1985 through the first
quarter of 2015. Subtracting the forecasts made in every quarter for that same quarter one year
ahead yielded the absolute error in the prediction. Normalizing the results involved converting
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the absolute values into percentages. The percent error calculation is straightforward; it divides
the absolute error in the forecast by the range of forecast values in the thirty years studied.
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The mean percent error over the period was 7.6 percent, the maximum upside error was
34.6 percent, the maximum downside error was 35.4 percent, and the standard deviation of the
errors was 12.9 percent.
Examining the data from the gRPCE demonstrates failure in all three domains. The
general errors are the results of chaotic behavior. The data shows that ninety-six of the 119
forecasts were not affected by black swans or asset bubbles. Of those 96, 41 were in error by at
least five percent. Therefore, there is a 41/96 or a forty-three percent chance of chaos distorting
the gRPCE projections by greater than five percent, an amount severe enough to upset planning.
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Modeling Economic Chaos
What makes an economy function? There are many possible answers. This section will
propose two possibilities and create models based on those possibilities and project behavior
based on the assumptions inherent in each of those possibilities. The first possibility is wealthbased. The individuals in an economy, personal or corporate, have wealth. The assumption is that
all these individuals desire to increase their wealth. To acquire this wealth, they create value for
the economy. Of course, some will try to increase their wealth by rent-seeking, that is, obtaining
wealth without creating value, but since their economic effect is limited, it is reasonable to
ignore them here.
Three primary variables drive the activity in an economy; what actors have, what they
want, and what they do to move from what they have, closer to what they want. For most actors,
this movement from what one has, to what one wants is called work but labeling it creating value
makes more sense. In the economy, all these actors combine, at any point in time, to create
aggregate have, aggregate want, and aggregate value creation. The driving variable is value
creation; in general, when aggregate value creation is positive, aggregate wealth increases;
however, when aggregate value creation is negative, that is, aggregate consumption exceeds
aggregate creation, aggregate wealth decreases.
We can use simpler terms for this discussion, calling aggregate value creation production,
as in the production of value. Likewise, we can simplify aggregate wealth to wealth and rename
the aggregate desire for more wealth as objective. These three are interdependent. Actors’
production is affected by current wealth and current objectives, wealth, in turn, is affected by
objectives and production, and objectives are affected by production and wealth. These
relationships can be expressed mathematically as a system of differential equations, letting
P=production, W=wealth and O=objectives and t=time:
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dP/dt = W - P, that is, the change in production equals wealth less current production
dW/dt = P - PO - W, that is, change in wealth equals production less production
multiplied by objectives less current wealth.
dO/dt = PW - O, that is, objectives equal production multiplied by wealth less current
objectives.
Since the effects of each of these variables on the others are not uniform it is necessary to
introduce balancing constants or factors. These can be called pf, wf, and of. We can then rewrite
the differential equations as:
dP/dt = pf(W-P), dW/dt = wf*P - PO - W and PW - of*O
The balancing factors values, while somewhat arbitrary, are chosen to best estimate the
magnitude of the effect of the modified variable on the system. A system dynamics model
created in Vensim simulation software can thoroughly describe the elements and relationships of
the system. Figure 11 shows the model diagram.
Since this is the first of several system dynamics models a brief explanation of these
models may be necessary. System dynamics models usually have two primary components,
stocks, represented by a box, and flows, represented by a pipe with a valve on it, flowing into or
out of a stock. In mathematical terms, the stock is the integral or accumulated sum of the flow,
and the flow is the derivative or rate of change of the stock. The other features of the model can
be variables or constants and the arrows indicate control, that is, an arrow from A to B means
that A controls B. When the stock has an arrow leading directly or indirectly back to the flow
into or out of that same stock the system becomes a differential equation(s) since representing
the system in conventional mathematical terms includes both an object and its derivative. In
Figure 11 on page 76, there are three stocks using the labels discussed above, Production,
Wealth, and Wealth Objective. Each of these is fed by a flow labeled dProduction, dWealth, and
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dObjective. The valve on each of these flows is in every case controlled by a scale factor, the
stock receiving the flow and one or two of the other stocks in the model.

Figure 11
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Since the flows are affected by the stocks they feed, the equations are differential
equations and since those flows are also affected by other stocks in the model, the result is a
system of differential equation. Systems of differential equations often cannot be solved
mathematically but must be evaluated numerically by calculating the changes in hundreds or
thousands of steps. This is usually done by a computer, however the computer code typically
used can by exceedingly opaque creating the need for a system dynamics model to illustrate
more transparently the underlying assumptions and connections. The system dynamics program,
in this case Vensim, translates the drawings, into which numerical parameters have been entered,
into equations that are numerically evaluated in thousands of individual steps. The results of
these calculations can be displayed as tables or graphs. In models involving thousands of steps
tables are of little value so graphs are the preferred method of displaying the results. The graphs
that follow the models show each of the points that were calculation connected with lines
between each set of two points.
When the model is run it generates the phase diagrams shown in Figures 12 through 14.
These phase diagrams show the general tendencies of the relationship between the variables as
opposed to a one-to-one correspondence between the two variables.
Figure 12 shows a loose association between increased production and increased wealth.
However, there are areas where this is not precisely true. For example, looking at the area
bounded by 0 on the left and 15 on the right, and 0 on top and -10 on the bottom, we can see that
in this space, production is positive while wealth is negative. This sort of interaction happens all
the time in an economy. One example is when one increases production without an increase in
compensation in hopes of a resulting increase in the rate of compensation, as in working harder
in hopes of getting a raise. However, after getting the raise, the individual may decide to ‘coast,’
work less diligently but still see their wealth increasing. When taken as a whole across millions
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of independent actors, these perturbations result in the chaotic, unpredictable behavior shown in
Figure 12.

Figure 12
Figure 13 on the following page may appear completely different, but it exemplifies the
same kind of behavior. In this case, the behavior creates an unexpected ‘mirror image’ in which
both an increase or decrease in production produces similar changes in the wealth objective. The
dichotomous method by which people evaluate their current situation may be the cause of this
unusual result. One way is by comparing oneself to one’s past self, and the other is by comparing
oneself to one’s peers. Also, as one decreases production, one sees the need to set higher goals,
and as one increases production, one sees that higher aspirations are realistic. As in the previous
example, the phase diagram shows general trends but no specific, predictable results. Millions of
individuals behaving independently produce unpredictable and sometimes unexplainable results
that are the essence of chaos.
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Figure 13
The same is true of Figure 14. Choosing a point on the horizontal axis does not
yield a unique point on the vertical axis. The behavior displays a similar ‘mirror image’ in which
either increasing or decreasing wealth can cause a similar change in the wealth objective. If we
start at the beginning, near 0, 0, it is possible to construct a narrative that goes like this; wealth
begins increasing, which allows an initial increase in wealth objective, which leads to giving up
wealth to increase education this leads to a temporary decrease in wealth objective. However,
after completing education, the wealth objective is lowered but not as low as the original starting
level, and the process begins again. This description is an oversimplification of one of many
narratives. However, as in the previous examples, the collective behavior of large numbers of
individuals produces chaos rather than a functional relationship that would indicate that wealth at
a specific level produces this objective level result and only this result.
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Figure 14

Graphing the variables makes it apparent that the behavior is chaotic. No functional
relationship exists between any two of the variables in any of the diagrams since knowing a
specific value for the independent variable provides no insight into the value of the dependent
variable. For example, if we choose to examine the economy's behavior displayed in Figure 12,
when the production value is seven, the equations return wealth values of anywhere between
negative ten and positive fifteen.
Of course, it is more common to refer to a country's aggregate production in an economy
as gross domestic product or GDP. Scaling the variables and graphing GDP over time leads to
the result displayed in Figure 15.
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Figure 15
While this does represent a functional relationship it is still chaotic since insignificant
changes in input variable produce similar but not identical output. The implication is that GDP is
chaotic and completely unpredictable. This is amplified by the fact that tiny changes in the
parameters result in vastly different outcomes. Therefore, what we see in the Figure 15 shows
behavior similar to actual GDP in that it oscillates erratically in a fairly limited range.
A second possibility to explain economic behavior is standard of living based. In this
model, the central assumption is that everyone desires to improve their financial circumstances
and improve their standard of living (SoL). Furthermore, the model assumes that the individual
'measures' standard of living in two ways; one by comparing the current standard of living with
that in the past, and the other by comparing one's standard of living with those around them.
Therefore, this model contains a stock measuring SoL compared to the past and another
comparing SoL with others. This dualism creates friction between the two, and the stock,
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perceived change in SoL, measures the friction. Finally, the aggregate individual value creation,
motivated by the interaction of the other three, feeds the remaining stock, which measures SoL.
Like the previous model, numerically evaluating the equations is necessary because they are too
complex to solve analytically.
While examining this model and the results of running the model, it is worth noticing that
the frictions, measured in this model and the previous one, are by no means unique. They are
similar to the frictions described in Lorenz’s weather models. Two air or water masses moving
past each other create similar frictions that create eddies in water and tornados and hurricanes in
the air. Human beings are incredibly complicated, and a part of that complexity is the capability
to simultaneously hold somewhat contradictory ideas in mind. For example, we want to have our
cake and eat too. These contradictions play out in the economy constantly; we want to save and
spend, want bigger and better, and also want to down-size, we want to earn more money, but we
want time to enjoy spending what we are earning. These and many more scenarios would create
the same kinds of friction displayed in this model and the previous one. Even in a small town, the
economy has the behaviors described in these models and dozens or hundreds of others.
Furthermore, while any one of these models can create chaos, the combined effect of many
frictions operating simultaneously creates a substantially more complex chaotic environment.
Since the actors base many of their decisions on their reaction to the chaos they observe, this
feedback creates an extraordinarily complex level two chaotic environment. Figure 16 below
displays the standard of living model, and Figures 17 through 20 on subsequent pages show
some of the run results.
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Figure 16
As was true in the previous model, notice that all of the first three stocks are affected by
their own values as well as the values of the other two. The final stock is controlled by both its
own value at any time as well the aggregated value of standard of living compared to others with
has been perturbated by the friction present.
Figures 17 through 19 display behavior similar to that shown in Figures 12 through 14
but not identical. This is why multiple frictions create even greater chaos.
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Figure 17
As was the case in Figure 12, Figure 17 shows general trends at the extremes. When the
perceived change in the standard of living is high, the perception of the standard of living
compared to others tends to be high. Similarly, when the perceived change in the standard of
living is low, the perception of the standard of living compared to others tends to become low.
Again, however, no clear trend exists in and around the center. These apparent contradictions
result from the friction created by the difficulties inherent in trying to make a static evaluation of
a state, based upon two unrelated measures that are sometimes parallel and at other times in
direct opposition.
Similar types of behavior are clear in Figure 18 below. As when comparing the standard
of living compared to others with the perceived standard of living, when comparing the
perceived change in the standard of living with the standard of living compared to the past, we
see similar behavior. We see that the general trend is more robust than in the previous
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comparison in that when either is positive, the other is also positive and when one is negative, so
is the other. However, positivity and negativity vary greatly, so no prediction is possible.

Figure 18
Figure 19 displays behavior similar to Figure 14 in the previous model. In this case, the
aggregate standard of living compared to the past is always positive as one would expect, and the
standard of living compared to others varies widely from positive to negative. This friction partly
exists because of the mental dualism discussed earlier and because 'others' is a large, diverse
group. For example, individuals might see that they are better off than they were last year and
better off than their neighbor to the south, who had previously been better off than they were. At
the same time, they may acknowledge that they are not as well off as their neighbor to the north,
who had previously been less well off. This comparison with others likely includes comparisons
with dozens of neighbors, friends, and acquaintances. In turn, these neighbors, friends, and
acquaintances change their behavior in response. This reaction creates level two chaos and
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makes any functional relationship impossible. The lack of this functional relationship means that
it is impossible to predict the dependent variable's behavior based upon the independent
variable's value.

Figure 19
Figures 20 and 21 are displayed together on page 87. They are displayed together to allow the
reader to make direct comparisons between them. While they both display the chaotic behavior
of the rise in SoL, they do not do so in precisely the same way. This change in behavior was
triggered by changing the input parameter, Initial SoL compared to Past, from 2.0 to 2.001. Note
that this is a change of only five ten thousandths of the initial value and any change of this
magnitude produces similar differences, some greater and some smaller. This is classic chaotic
behavior, it is the same phenomenon that Lorenz (1972) observed in his weather models, and
which christened the
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Figure 20

Figure 21
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name, the butterfly effect. This instability confirms that the behavior is indeed chaotic. The
results produced by these models demonstrate that economic behavior is chaotic. Of course,
models are not proof; they are tests of assumptions. However, when combined with the evidence
presented earlier, it seems likely enough that economics is a chaotic system that it is reasonable
to shift the burden of proof to those may who claim that it is not chaotic.

Results in the Second Domain: Bubbles
Results of Bubbles on gRPCE
Referring back to the data collected on the gRPCE 23 of the 119 Federal Reserve forecasts
(Figure 10, page 73), twenty-three of the forecasting errors greater than five percent were
attributable to asset bubbles. The extremes are attributable to the asset bubble of 1985-87 and the
housing bubble of 2007-8 as well as the less pronounced dotcom stock bubble of 2000-3.
Therefore, there is a 23/119 or nineteen percent chance of an asset bubble causing a forecasting
error greater than five percent.
Discovering Bubble Behavior
Below are graphs of the data collected on the historical bubble episodes. These bubbles
include the first three; the Tulipmania bubble Figure 22, the South Sea bubble, Figure 23, and the
Mississippi bubble, Figure 24. A random selection of subsequent bubbles followed these first
three; the DJIA from 1928 to 1930, Figure 25, the S&P 500 in 1986 and 1987, Figure 26, the
Nikkei 225 from 1987 thru 1991, Figure 27, the Nasdaq 100 from 1994 thru 2003, Figure 28, the
Tesla stock bubble in 2014 and 2015, Figure 29, and the Bitcoin bubble in 2017 and 2018, Figure
30.
The graphs have the essential areas of similarities indicated by colored circles. The red
circles mark what Rodrigue calls the first sell-off or the exit of the fundamentalists, those
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investors that use underlying fundamentals to guide their investment decisions. The orange
circles indicate what Rodrigue calls "the new paradigm" or what could be called the exit of some
of the mixed-mode investors that Rodrigue calls "institutional investors" but have some traits of
the fundamentalists and some traits of speculators. The green circles mark what Rodrigue calls
the "return to normal" It is speculators jumping in at what they believe is a buying opportunity
that cause this. Finally, the purple circles indicate what Rodrigue calls the "despair" and the
"return to the mean". These result from speculators and mixed-mode investors giving up, and the
fundamentalists see the renewed undervaluing of the asset and begin reinvesting. This point does
not trigger a new cycle as one might think because the speculators and mixed-mode investors
consider the asset toxic, and only the fundamentalists will invest in it again for quite some time.
Figures 22 through 30 on the following pages are displayed without individual comment
since the actual data shown in the graph is unimportant. They are presented to illustrate a pattern
that is best seen by viewing the graphs in uninterrupted succession.
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Figure 31 below shows Rodrigue’s summary diagram. The parts indicated by the colored
circles in the preceding graphs are labeled. It is clear that Rodrigue’s diagram reasonably
summarizes the patterns seen in Figures 22 through 30. Rodrigue does not claim that every
bubble looks precisely like his diagram, but it has essentially the same elements. The key
elements are those circled in Figures 22 through 30, the first sell-off, the new paradigm, the
denial and return to normal, the despair and return to the mean. The time scale and asset value
magnitude can vary widely, but the general pattern remains the same. Rodrigue explains that the
bubble begins when the ‘smart money’ recognizes an undervalued asset class; their investment
causes the price to rise. This buying attracts the attention of institutional investors who begin to
purchase. Now that this buying has increased the price further, the asset is overvalued, so the
smart money exits.

Figure 31
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As the price resumes its increase, the public begins to buy in first with enthusiasm but later
greedily. The delusion follows that this is sustainable and seen as the new paradigm, the new
‘true value.’ Then, the price drops, and the bulls deny its reality seeing it instead as a buying
opportunity; this causes the asset to rise again but without reaching its previous heights. The next
drop instills fear and panic selling, rapidly taking the price to below actual value, and the smart
money buys in again, and the price returns to its uninflated value. The other investor classes stay
on the sidelines since the asset has already burned them once.
Modeling Bubble Behavior
A system dynamics model, shown below, seeks to explain Rodrigue’s diagram. Figure 32
displays the model showing the asset price as a function of supply and demand over time. It
shows the asset price depends on aggregate demand which is a composite of smart money
demand (SM), institutional investor demand (II), and public demand (P).

Figure 32
It is clear from the model that while the smart money and the institutional investors to a
lesser extent are basing their demand on fundamentals, primarily the price to value ratio, the
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public is basing its decisions primarily on asset price changes and extrapolating those changes
into the future to predict behavior.
It is important to restate that models are not proof but attempts to learn and to try to
explain. This model may be only one of many possible models that can explain the behavior
Rodrigue presents in his book. However, while this model is not the only possible explanation
for the behavior it does generate data that compares very favorably to Rodrigue’s description.
Figure 33 displays the graph generated when running the model.

Figure 33
The model successfully captures the nuances of Rodrigue’s explanation and can therefore
is a reasonable explanation for the behavior of asset prices. The seven percent was derived from

97

the average annual increase of the S & P 500 minus the average rate of inflation. The blue line is
the likely ‘real’ value of the asset arrived at by adding a seven percent per year increase. It is
clear that the graph it generates is similar in every respect the graph published by Rodrigue and
displayed in Figure 31. As with his graph, the red line is the behavior of the asset price as it
varies over time.
If we accept the model as an explanation, we can base our proposed solution on the
problem as described by the model. The advantage of using a system dynamics model is that it
lays bare all the assumptions about the relationships governing the model. It is the assumptions
behind any model where true debate resides.

Results in the Third Domain: Black Swans
Results of Black Swans on the gRPCE
None of the ten blacks swan events not caused by asset bubbles in the past two hundred
years with an economic effect greater than five percent were in the time period in which the
gRPCE data was collected. However, since there were ten blacks swan events not caused by
asset bubbles in the past two hundred years this implies a 10/200 or five percent chance of a
black swan event affecting the economy by greater than five percent.
Discovering the Economic Effect of Black Swans
Since black swan events (BSEs) are, by definition, unpredictable, forecasting them is out
of the question. Although there is insufficient data to compare government success or failure in
coping with BSEs, it is reasonable to examine the effects of the recent pandemic on the
economy. There have been three BSEs not caused by an asset bubble in the past seventy years.
Those caused by asset bubbles were eliminated since they were covered in the previous section.
The first was caused by the unexpected invasion of South Korea by the North in 1950 that began
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the Korean War. The second was the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, in which the twelve nations of
OPEC stopped selling oil to the United States. The third is the current CoVid-19 pandemic.
Figure 34 shows the history of the quarterly real personal consumption expenditures as a percent
change from the previous quarter. The Korean War and the current pandemic are visible, and the
OPEC embargo in about the center is the only other dip below six percent.
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Figure 34
It is clear from the graph shown in Figure 34, that the current pandemic has been far more
devastating to the economy than the others have. As an example, the Monetary Policy Report of
June 12, 2020, states, “After having increased at a solid 2.7 percent pace in 2019, real PCE fell at
an annual rate of 6.8 percent in the first quarter of 2020, one of the largest quarterly drops in the
history of this series” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 14).
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While the projections from the first quarter of 2019 will not be formally released for
public use until 2024 since public release is five years after the fact, it is reasonable to believe
that the projection would have been near the .22 average change in percent rate from the
previous month of 2019. The Report goes on to say, “real PCE collapsed, falling 6.7 percent in
March and a record 13.2 percent in April.
Although indicators point to an increase in May—which is consistent with some
relaxation of government restrictions—taken together, the April data and May indicators point to
an unprecedented decline in second-quarter consumer outlays” (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 14).
While the effect on the United States and the world economy was devastating, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that government action in response to the pandemic caused
much of the economic impact and may have been unnecessary.
A recent study at Johns Hopkins University concluded,
“Overall, our meta-analysis fails to confirm that lockdowns have had a large, significant
effect on mortality rates. Studies examining the relationship between lockdown strictness
(based on the OxCGRT stringency index) find that the average lockdown in Europe and
the United States only reduced COVID-19 mortality by 0.2% compared to a COVID-19
policy based solely on recommendations. Shelter-in-place orders (SIPOs) were also
ineffective. They only reduced COVID-19 mortality by 2.9%” (Herby, Jonung, and
Hanke 2022, 40).
Since the government restrictions caused virtually all the economic effects rather than the
pandemic itself, it is reasonable to conclude that the government created the economic fallout by
the inappropriate use of government power to attempt to mitigate the effects of a BSE. The
government responses at all levels of government, while varying somewhat from place to place
were more like a CPE response than an FME response. While we have no way of knowing how
an FME response might have fared, it is reasonable to suggest that it could hardly have been
worse than what occurred. Due to its severity, this one example seems sufficient to conclude that
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government taking actions likely to affect the economy in response to BSEs is unwise at best
and, considering the devastation caused, bordering on criminal at worst.

Results in the Combined Domains
Combining the results of the gRPCE study from the three domains is a simple procedure.
The separate chances of disrupting the economy by greater than five percent are a forty-three
percent chance due to chaos, a nineteen percent due to asset bubbles and a five percent chance
due to black swan events. The calculation is (1-(1-.43)*(1-.19)*(1-.05)) = .56 or a fifty-six
percent chance that at least one of these events will create a forecasting error of greater than five
percent. Forecasts that are incorrect forty-four percent of the time are not forecasts, they are
guesses.
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CHAPTER V: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
The research results indicate that the public pressure from some quarters to move the
United States government toward socialism is increasingly influencing public policy in the
United States in a direction that is likely to fail. These results indicate that a centrally planned
economy (CPE) cannot succeed. It does not seem possible for a CPE, planned by experts, to
result in greater economic good than can be achieved by spontaneous order created by the
combination of individual choices that make up the free market. While the evidence is
incomplete, the early indications are that CPEs are unlikely to succeed because planning an
economy requires making economic forecasts that are not and will never be sufficiently accurate
due to the separate and combined effects of chaos, bubbles, and BSEs.
The introduction of this paper used the analogy of two gardens; the early evidence points
to the economy being more like the weather than the environment in a greenhouse. Now that the
research summarized in this paper is complete, the economy has proven to be very much like the
weather. While some might dream of eventually controlling the weather, the existing evidence
shows that is not now and never will be possible because there are far too many variables that
will never be controllable. Since the economy has proven similar, successfully controlling the
economy may also never be possible. It is of great concern that attempting to dramatically
change the economy of the United States in the absence of evidence of likely success places the
economy at grave risk. Placing a national economy at risk should never be considered for
ideological reasons instead of economic realities.
Conclusions
The research question presented at the beginning of this paper was: Is it possible to
forecast economic variables with sufficient accuracy to allow a centrally planned economy result
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in greater economic good than can be achieved by a free market? The preponderance of the
evidence uncovered in this investigation indicates that the answer to the research question is no.
The evidence shows that a centrally planned economy cannot result in greater economic good
than can be achieved by spontaneous order, as is created by the combination of individual
choices that make up the free market. The evidence shows that turning right at the crossroads
introduced in Chapter I, would be the best course, followed by going straight ahead and lastly
turning left.
This research has found that the economy is uncontrollable and that attempts to do so are
more likely to do more harm than good. This study has shown that three domains, chaos,
bubbles, and black swans, negatively impact attempts to control the economy. It has
demonstrated that any one of these is capable of disrupting planning and control significantly and
that their combined effect is such that decisions about what to do at any time to improve the
economy stand a smaller of success than what flipping a coin would achieve.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Solutions in the First Domain: Chaos
In the first domain the challenge is to survive and thrive in a chaotic environment. Three
of the most translated and read texts ever written give part of the answer. The Bible says, “Ship
your grain across the sea; after many days you may receive a return. Invest in seven ventures,
yes, in eight; you do not know what disaster may come upon the land” (Ecclesiastes 11:1-2).
Shakespeare’s Antonio in Merchant of Venice said it this way, “Believe me, no. I thank
my fortune for it —, My ventures are not in one bottom trusted, Nor to one place, nor is my
whole estate, Upon the fortune of this present year. Therefore, my merchandise makes me not
sad” (Act 1, Scene1).
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Cervantes’ Sancho gave his answer as, “es parte del sabio guardarse hoy para mañana y
no arriesgar todos sus huevos en una canasta” translated to, “’Tis the part of a wise man to keep
himself today for tomorrow, and not venture all his eggs in one basket” (Don Quixote, 1615).
All these admonitions include the assumption that the world is chaotic place and advise,
as a defense against chaos, diversification. Intentionally or not these ancient texts are advocating
the advantages of a free market where economic control is diversified by spreading the decisionmaking across millions of producers and consumers rather than a CPE in which all the eggs are
in one basket.
The second recommendation involves the idea of a middleman. The purpose of the
middleman is to bring the consumer and producer together to negotiate price. This is a role that
government fills poorly because rather than allowing consumer and producer to negotiate,
government injects its agenda and often makes the situation worse. One of the popular criticisms
of the free market today is the problem of student educational debt. This is a problem created by
government intervening in the free market in education.
In the twenty-year period from 1997-98 to 2017-18 federal grant aid to college students
in constant dollars more than tripled (Total Grant Aid n.d.). Reliance on federal money has the
effect of removing the consumer, the student, from the producer, the educational institution. This
means that consumers are constrained from negotiating the value with the producers. Setting
‘fair’ value is what free markets do best and what controlled markets do poorly. Separating
consumer and producer tends to reduce ‘smart shopping’ since, in this case, the consumer is not
paying the full price of the product. This has the inflationary effect of allowing prices to rise
without any accompanying increase in product quality. Subsidizing costs provides an incentive
for costs to rise, and McPherson and Schapiro found that, “public four-year institutions tended to
raise tuition by $50 for every $100 increase in federal student aid” (2006, 1428). Educational
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institutions have no incentive to cut costs and the evidence indicates that the increases in costs
are not devoted to improving instruction. In fact, in the past thirty years instructional spending
has decreased from forty-one percent to twenty-nine percent of institutional budgets (Simon
n.d.). During that same period tuition has increased eight times faster than wages (Maldonado
2018). Therefore, students thirty years ago, who could, with a little help from their families work
their way through college with a part time job are now eight times less likely to be able to do so
and many must rely on government aid or debt or both. Furthermore, those students thirty years
ago would have had a greater percent of institutional budgets devoted to their educations.
Figure 35 shows a system dynamics model created to investigate the relationship between
government aid and tuition cost. The model uses an initial tuition cost of $3360, the cost of
tuition in public four-year colleges in 2018 dollars (Cost of Tuition n.d.). The maximum
acceptable tuition is an assumption. Assumptions are the basis of all models, and it is essential to
identify them so that the reader can question the assumptions. In this case, it seems reasonable to
believe that a ten-fold increase in tuition would be the most that would be accepted.
The fraction of the limit remaining is simply the fraction of the Maximum Acceptable
Tuition that remains in the Cost of Tuition at any time. When run, this model produces the
results shown in Figure 36. By year 30, the 2018-19 school year, the cost of tuition has increased
threefold, from $3360 to a bit over $10000. The rate of increase is calculated from the published
data on tuition cost increases (Cost of Tuition n.d.). As in the system dynamics models presented
earlier, the arrows indicate controls. In this model, the Cost of Tuition is directly controlled by
where it began, the Initial Cost of Tuition. It is also controlled by the Cost of Tuition itself, the
fraction of the limit remaining, and the Rate of Increase control The Increase in Tuition. The
Maximum Acceptable Tuition controls the fraction of the limit remaining. Since the Rate of
Increase is derived from inflation-adjusted dollars, the Rate of Increase is not due to inflation.
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The Cost of Tuition is rising independent of inflation and as mentioned above, does not reflect an
increase in spending on improving instruction.

Figure 35

The best explanation for this increase is that, as described above, the increase in
government aid causes the Cost of Tuition to rise. This explanation is reasonable when one
considers that since students and parents are not paying the total value of the cost of education,
they are more careless in choosing how best to spend the money they have available. As tuition
rises, students and parents adapt to the increased cost rather than seeking lower-cost alternatives.
If government aid were not available, students and parents would feel pressure to shop more
carefully and make sure that every increase in the cost of education was accompanied by a
corresponding increase in the quality of education received. The graph on the next page shows
the rise in tuition in constant (2018) dollars as a function of time in years. Rather than increasing
due to time, we would want to see rising tuition as a function of instructional quality.

106

Figure 36
The structure of the model includes another assumption, that the data would best be
modeled with a logistic equation. That equation is shown below in general form and then in
specific form using the numbers from our model.
Cost of tuition, C is expressed as a function of time, t.
tuition, $3360,

is the limit to the annual

is the initial amount of annual tuition, $3360 and r is the rate of increase,

.0645.

The results of the calculations are expressed in Figure 37. The center column is the cost
generated by the equation and the right-hand column is the actual data (College Board n.d.).
Actual data almost never exactly matches a mathematical model because actual data tends to
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change inconsistantly. The mathematical model ‘smooths’ those changes. It is appearant
however that the mathematical model matches the data very well.

Years Since 1989

Modeled Cost per Year

Actual Cost per Year
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Figure 37
When the data in Figure 37 is graphed the result is shown in Figure 38 on the following page.
It is a severe error to interpret this model or any model as fact. A model is a possible
explanation of the data based on the assumptions in the model. This model does, though, present
an essential point of view in this discussion. Notice that the model contains no variable for
quality of education or student life; it only contains a theoretical structure that expresses the
belief that the separation of consumers and producers results in rising prices. The model
indicates that this theory can accurately explain the behavior of the data without the need for any
other factors. It clearly shows that the government injecting money into education could be the
only factor driving up costs.
Creating a very similar model to address the rising cost of healthcare would be equally
demonstrative. In healthcare, as in education, the consumer is separated from the producer by
insurance companies. There is no advertising by healthcare providers seeking customers based
on lower cost. The providers understand that the consumer is in no position to comparison shop
for less expensive alternatives. Keeping the free market from adjusting prices based on value as
measured by consumers creates imbalances in the economy that other segments of the economy
must correct.
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Mathematically Modeling Tuition Cost
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Figure 38

Therefore, the recommended solution for dealing with the chaos presented in the
economy is to allow the free market do what the free market does better than any alternative,
allow the negotionation of value between the consumer and the producer.

Recommendations for Solutions in the Second Domain: Bubbles
The Federal Long-term Investment Protection Tax
Since the problem of asset bubbles is not caused by 'legitimate' investing but by
speculation. Speculation is driven by greed and since we will never eliminate human greed, we
must find a solution directly addressing greed. The only way to eliminate the effects of greed is
to eliminate the possibility of profiting from that greed. A scaled capital gain tax that favors
long-term investment over speculation would be an excellent way to do that. One solution might
be a new tax law called the Federal Long-term Investment Protection Tax or F.L.I.P. Tax. This
FLIP tax introduces ample protection for long-term investing and a severe tax penalty for
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'flipping' an asset. In addition, this new tax law would require reporting any investment asset
trade or sale, including the date of purchase and purchase price of the asset and the date of sale
and the asset's selling price. Then the profit from the sale, if any, would be taxed on a sliding
scale.
A possible formula for the tax could be T = .75t, where T is the amount of tax to be paid
on the sale and t is the amount of time elapsed between the purchase and the sale of the asset.
Figure 39 is a graph of the function.
With this tax system, holding an asset for less than four years puts the tax rate above the
highest marginal rate for ordinary income under current tax law. The asset would have to be held
for between six and a half and seven and a half years to get to the rates that current tax law
allows after one year. After seven and a half years, the rate continues to descend until, at thirty
years, it is essentially zero. There are three tangible benefits of this plan:
1. It provides a massive disincentive to ‘flip’ an asset. This tax would have the effect of
dramatically reducing if not eliminating speculation. Engaging in a highly leveraged and
speculative investment would create an even more significant disincentive since the tax
raises the risk-reward ratio beyond acceptable levels.
2. It has the benefit of significantly increasing the rewards for the long-term investor.
Rewarding the long-term investor is essential because of its positive effects on the
national economy and its guarantee, to the investor, of greater rewards. It also would
benefit the average homeowner by making the sale of a home held for a longer term or by
applying the proceeds of sale from one home to another home as is allowed by current tax
law, to have the profit from the ultimate sale tax-free.
3. The only way to eliminate market crashes is to eliminate the booms or bubbles.
If this tax reduces speculation to the expected extent, it will soften or eliminate asset
bubbles.
Some might worry that the tax early on is excessive; they might be concerned about the
need to sell an asset in case of an emergency. However, this is not a cause for concern since the
principal of the investment remains whole; the investor can get their money back at any point
since only the profit is taxed.
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Figure 39
Figures 40 and 41 below show how the investment would play out over ten and thirty
years, assuming a seven percent growth rate, compared with that same investment with no tax.
After about fifteen years, the tax has essentially no effect on the value. Figure 41 shows more
clearly the earlier part of the curves. As we zoom in, we can better see the disincentives of
flipping an asset.
So, the Federal Long-term Investment Protection Tax is a possible solution to the problem of bubbles
that effectively shifts policy from monetary policy to fiscal policy and does so in ways that benefit the economy
as a whole and the individual long-term investor. The shift from monetary policy to fiscal policy is also more
democratic than current regulatory methods because it transfers the policy from the hands of unelected,
unresponsive regulators to the people's elected representatives.
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Figure 40

Figure 41
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Recommendations for Solutions in the Third Domain: Black Swans
Humanity has been dealing with black swan events throughout its history. However, it
has never approached BSEs by trying to forecast them since humanity has recognized that they
cannot be forecast. Instead, humanity always has dealt with them by preparing for the worst. The
first efforts involved storing up food and supplies for times of drought or disaster. Later, wise
folks created 'rainy day' funds so that the resources to deal with them would be available when
disaster struck. Today, many people prepare for disaster by stockpiling food; the LDS church
suggests its members store a one-year supply. In addition, many people have bugout bags,
backpacks loaded with at least three days of provisions, ready to go in case of an emergency.
The most common modern preparation for black swan events is insurance. Most people
have car insurance, health insurance, life insurance, and home insurance, all held in preparation
for unexpected events. Of course, it is not practical for the government to purchase insurance, but
it is feasible for the government to self-insure. For example, instead of borrowing to help the
citizens in a pandemic, the government could create a special fund consuming five percent of the
annual budget until at least six months of annual expenditures are acquired. Then the
government, like its citizens, would benefit both from the additional security and from receiving
interest on its savings. The government should prepare for disaster in much the same way its
citizens do, including helping individuals plan for disaster. One way to do this would be to
eliminate income tax on funds held in savings up to the account holder's annual income. Taking
steps to prepare the government to mitigate the effects of a BSE might include the government
doing what its more prepared citizens do, avoiding debt, living within its means, and having
plans for unlikely emergencies. Government economic policy regarding BSEs should be an
enhanced version of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) rather than the

113

Federal Reserve managing the economic fallout. That is what the citizens do; government should
heed their wisdom.

Final Words
The free market and true capitalism are almost miraculous in that they can order an
economy with no direction. It is reminiscent of how the human body or any complex organism
functions. In complex living organisms, the conscious mind, much like government, is incapable
of regulating the mechanisms that allow the organism to flourish. Instead, the cells in an
organism, much like the citizens in a national economy, act in their own best interest and do
what they must so that they can live, grow, and reproduce. Occasionally, the process goes wrong,
as in cancer, when cells pursuing their own best interest produce an undesirable result for the
organism. This is when conscious effort, in the form of treatment is required to control rogue
cells pursuing their own best interests as in corruption. That is similar to a legitimate role of
government in the economy. However, the body and the free market both work incredibly well
for the most part. One could ask if the organism would be better off under conscious control but
imagine extra brainpower that would be required to manage the thirty-seven trillion cells in the
human body directly; if one could consciously direct one cell every second, it would take one
million one hundred forty-seven thousand years to give every cell just the first command.
This drive to pursue their best interests, by what some think of as subordinate entities,
like cells in the body or producers and consumers in an economy, is the reason there is always a
flourishing black market in countries that have tried CPEs. These black markets are the ultimate
proof that CPEs are not what the citizens of a country want or need. Producers and consumers
want to be free to negotiate value and pursue their best interests in the manner that only freemarket capitalism provides.
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The free market and true, uncorrupted capitalism are almost miraculous in that the
spontaneous order created by the combination of individual choices that make up the free market
can order an economy with no organized direction and can do so in the best interests of the
citizenry. No other economic system has ever provided greater good to more people.

115

REFERENCES
Aliber, Robert Z. and Charles P. Kindleberger. 2015. Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of
Financial Crises. New York: Wiley, 3rd ed.
Atkinson, Glen. 2004. “Common Ground for Institutional Economics and System Dynamics
Modeling.” System Dynamics Review, 20, no. 4: 275-285. ProQuest, Liberty University.
Bang, Dan, and Chris D. Frith. 2017. “Making Better Decisions in Groups.” Royal Society Open
Science, 4(8), 1-22. https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.170193.
Barro, Robert J., Ursúa, José F. and Weng, Joanna. 2020. “The Coronavirus and the Great
Influenza Pandemic”. NBER Working Paper Series. National Bureau of Economic
Research. Working Paper 26866.
Batitsky, Vadim and Zoltan Domotor. 2007. "When Good Theories make Bad Predictions."
Synthese 157, no. 1: 79-103. ProQuest, Liberty University.
Bureau of the Census. 1918. “Mortality Statistics 1918”. Accessed October 3, 2021.
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsushistorical/mortstatsh_1918.pdf.
Bureau of the Census. 1918. “Mortality Statistics 1919”. Accessed October 3, 2021.
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsushistorical/mortstatsh_1919.pdf
Blaufus, Kay, Jonathan Bob, Daniela Lorenz, and Matthias Trinks. 2016. How Will the Court
Decide? – Tax Experts’ versus Laymen's Predictions, European Accounting Review,
25:4, 771-792, DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2015.1114423.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2020. “Monetary Policy Report.”
FederalReserve.gov, June 12, 2020. Accessed February 3, 2022.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/20200612_mprfullreport.pdf.
Bullock, Christopher. 1716. The Cobler of Preston: A Farce. London: Blandon. Accessed
November 12, 2021.
https://archive.org/details/coblerofprestonf00bull/page/n3/mode/2up?ref=ol&view=theater.

Burdekin, RCK. 2020. “Economic and Financial Effects of the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu
Pandemic”. Journal of Infectious Disease & Therapy, 8: 439. Research Gate, Liberty
University.
Camazine, Scott, et al. 2001. Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press. Kindle.

Cardell, Doug. 2019. “An Economy of Errors” Prepared for PLCY 700. Liberty University.
———. 2021. “’Tis Impossible to Be Sure of Any Thing but Death and Taxes” Prepared for
PLCY 870. Liberty University.

116
Carswell, J. 1960. The South Sea Bubble. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Carvalho, Vasco M., Alberto Martin, and Jaume Ventura. “Understanding Bubbly Episodes”.
The American Economic Review, 102, No. 3: 95-100. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Chang, Victor, Russell Newman, Robert John Walters, and Gary Brian Wills. 2016. “Review of
Economic Bubbles”. International Journal of Information Management, 36: 497–506.
Elsevier, Liberty University.
Congressional Budget Office Staff. 1963-2020. Budget and Economic Data. Accessed August
12, 2021. https://www.cbo.gov/about/products.
Correia, Sergio, Luck, Stephan and Verner, Emil. 2020. “Pandemics Depress the Economy,
Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu”. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561560.
Dalal, Siddhartha R., Edward B. Fowlkes, and Bruce Hoadley. 1989. “Risk Analysis of the
Space Shuttle: Pre-Challenger Prediction of Failure”. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 84, no. 408: 945-957. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Dantas, Bruno Carvalho. 2015. “Complexity and Technocracy: The Hayekian Critique of
Neoclassical Law & Economics”. Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines,
21(1-2): 1–32. DOI 10.1515/jeeh-2014-0018.
Dodder, Rebecca and Dare, Robert. 2000. “Complex Adaptive Systems and Complexity Theory:
Inter-related Knowledge Domains.” ESD.83: Research Seminar in Engineering Systems
Massachusetts Institute of Technology October 31, 2000.
Dror, Itiel, Jeff Kukucka, Saul M. Kassin and Patricia A. Zapf. 2018. “When Expert Decision
Making Goes Wrong: Consensus, Bias, the Role of Experts, and Accuracy.” Journal of
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 7: 162-163. Elsevier, Liberty University.
Edge, Rochelle M., Michael T. Kiley, and Jean-Phillippe LaForte. 2010. “A Comparison of
Forecast Performance between Federal Reserve Staff Forecasts, Simple Reduced-form
Models, and a DSGE Model”. Journal of Applied Economics, 25: 720-754. JSTOR,
Liberty University.
Fair, Ray C. 2011. “Analyzing Macroeconomic Forecastability”. Journal of Forecasting 31: 99108. Accessed April 13, 2021. https://onlinelibrary-wileycom.ezproxy.liberty.edu/doi/full/10.1002/for.1216.
The Federal Reserve Staff. 1936-2015. The Fed - Historical Materials by Year. Accessed August
12, 2021. https://www.federalreserve.gov.
The Federal Reserve Staff. 2020. “Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (gRPCE: Q/Q
Growth; Annualized Percentage Points)”. Philadelphia Fed's Greenbook Data Set.
Accessed November 14, 2021. https://www.philadelphiafed.org/surveys-and-data/realtime-data-research/philadelphia-data-set.

117
Forrester, Jay W. 1971. Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems. Cambridge, MA: Alumni
Association of M.I.T.
Forrester, Jay W. 1969. Urban Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press.
Foster, John. 2005. “From Simplistic to Complex Systems in Economics”. Cambridge Journal of
Economics, 29: 873-892. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Frehen, Rik G. P., William N. Goetzmann, and K.GeertRouwenhorst. 2013. “New Evidence on
the First Financial Bubble”. Journal of Financial Economics, 108: 585-607. Elsevier,
Liberty University.
Frendreis, John and Raymond Tatalovich. 2000. “Accuracy and Bias in Macroeconomic
Forecasting by the Administration, the CBO, and the Federal Reserve Board”. Polity, 32,
no. 4: 623-632. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Friedman, Milton, and Rose. 1980. Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. Orlando: Harcourt.
Kindle.
Gaeto, Lillian R. and Mazumder, Sandeep. 2019. “Measuring the Accuracy of Federal Reserve
Forecasts.” Southern Economic Journal, 85, no. 3: 960–984. Wiley Online Library,
Liberty University.
Gali, Jordi. 2014. “Monetary Policy and Rational Asset Price Bubbles”. American Economic
Review, 104, no. 3: 721–752. ProQuest, Liberty University.
Garber, Peter M. 1990. "Famous First Bubbles." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 no. 2: 3554. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Girdzijauskas, Stasys, Dalia Štreimikienė, Jonas Čepinskis, Vera Moskaliova, Edita Jurkonytė,
and Ramūnas Mackevičius. 2009. “Formation of Economic Bubbles: Causes and Possible
Preventions”. Technological and Economic Development of Economy, 15 no. 2: 267–280.
Elsevier, Liberty University.
Gordon, John Steele. "The Spanish Flu Pandemic and the U.S. Economy." ABA Banking
Journal. May-June 2020: 54. Business Insights: Global. Web. 18 Nov. 2021.
Green, Kesten C., J. Scott Armstrong and Willie Soon. 2009. “Validity of Climate Change Forecasting
for Public Policy Decision Making”. International Journal of Forecasting. 25, no. 4: 826-833.
Science Direct, Liberty University.
Gwartney, James D. 2018. Economics: Private and Public Choice. Boston, MA: Cengage
Learning.
Hageback, Niklas. 2017. “Archetypes as Triggers of Financial Bubbles.” Journal of Behavioral
Finance, 18, no. 1: 86-98. DOI: 10.1080/15427560.2017.1276582.

118
Hayek, F.A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Kindle ed. The Collected works
of Friedrich August Hayek, edited by v, vol. 1. New York, N.Y: Routledge.
________, 2007. The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents. The collected works of F.A.
Hayek, edited by v, vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayes, Adam. 2019. “Dutch Tulip Bulb Market Bubble Definition.”
https://www.investopedia.com. Accessed June 10, 2021.
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dutch_tulip_bulb_market_bubble.asp.
Herby, Jonas, Lars Jonung, and Steve H. Hanke. 2022. “A Literature Review and Metaanalysis.” Studies in Applied Economics, no. 200 (January): 1–61.
Higgs, Robert. 2012. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American
Government. Independent studies in political economy. Oakland, California: Independent
Institute.
Hofman, Jake M., Amit Sharma, and Duncan J. Watts. 2017. “Prediction and Explanation in
Social Systems.” Science, 355, no. 6324: 486-488. DOI:10.1126/science.aal3856.
Hritonenko, Natali and Yuri Yatsenko. 2013. Mathematical Modeling in Economics, Ecology
and the Environment. New York: Springer Science+Business Media. Kindle.
Jansen, Dennis W. And Ruby Pandey Kishan. 1996. “An Evaluation of Federal Reserve
Forecasting”. Journal of Macroeconomics, 18, no. 1:89-109. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Joutz, Fred and H. O. Stekler. 2000. “An Evaluation of the Predictions of the Federal Reserve”.
International Journal of Forecasting, 16: 17-38. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Kirman, Alan. 2016. “Complexity and Economic Policy: A Paradigm Shift or a Change in
Perspective? A Review Essay on David Colander and Roland Kupers’s Complexity and
the Art of Public Policy” Journal of Economic Literature, 54 no. 2: 534–572.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.54.2.534
Kleer, Richard A. 2015. “Riding a Wave: The Company's Role in the South Sea Bubble”. The
Economic History Review, 68, no. 1: 264-285. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Koppl, Roger. 2018. Expert Failure. Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Koppl, Roger, Stuart Kauffman, Teppo Felin and Giuseppe Longo. 2015. “Economics for a
Creative World.” Journal of Institutional Economics, 11, no. 1: 1-31. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137414000150.
Kunieda, Takuma, and Akihisa Shibata. 2016. “Asset Bubbles, Economic Growth, and a Selffulfilling Financial Crisis”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 82: 70-84. Elsevier, Liberty
University.

119
Kuttner, Robert. 1999. “What Do You Call an Economist with a Prediction? Wrong.” Business
Week, August 6: 22-23. EBSCO, Liberty University.
Law, John. 1705 Money and Trade Considered with a Proposal for Supplying the Nation with
Money. Edinburgh: Heirs and Successors of Andrew Anderson. Accessed July 3, 2021.
The Avalon Project : Money and Trade Considered (yale.edu).
www.avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/mon.asp.
Lorenz, Edward N. 1963. “Determinisitic Nonperiodic Flow”. Journal of the Atmospheric
Sciences, 20, no. 2: 130-141. SAGE, Liberty University.
Lorenz, Edward U. 1972. "Predictability: does the flap of a butterfly's wings in Brazil set off a
tornado in Texas?”. Paper presented at American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS) 139th meeting. Accessed July 12, 2021.
Static.gymporalen.dk/sites/lru.dk/files/lru/132_kap6_lorenz_artikel_the_butterfly_effect.
pdf (gymportalen.dk).
Mackay, Charles. 2013. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. United
States: Seven Treasures Publications.
________. 1980. The Mississippi Scheme. London: Andrew Pub. Co.
Mackey, John, and Raj Sisoda. 2013. Conscious Capitalism. Boston: Harvard Business School.
Kindle.
Makridakis, Spyros. 1981. “If We Cannot Forecast How Can We Plan?”. Long Range Planning,
14, no.3: 10-20. Elsevier, Liberty University.
Makridakis, Spyros, Robin M. Hogarth, and Anil Gaba. “Why Forecasts Fail. What to Do
Instead”. MITSloan Management Review, 51, no. 2: 83-90. Science Direct, Liberty
University.
Makridakis, Spyros and Nassim Nicholas Taleb. 2009. “Decision Making and Planning under
Low Levels of Predictability”. International Journal of Forecasting. 25, no. 4: 716-733.
Science Direct, Liberty University.
———. 2009. “Living in a World of Low Levels of Predictability”. International Journal of
Forecasting. 25, no. 4: 840-844. Science Direct, Liberty University.
Maldonado, Camilo. 2018. “Price of College Increasing Almost 8 Times Faster Than Wages.”
Forbes.com, July 24, 2018. Accessed January 19, 2022.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/camilomaldonado/2018/07/24/price-of-college-increasingalmost-8-times-faster-than-wages/#bcb1c5166c1d.
Marani, Marco, Gabriel G. Katul, William K. Pan, and Anthony J. Parolari. 2021. “Intensity and
Frequency of Extreme Novel Epidemics”. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America. 118, no. 35: page numbers not available until
published on August 31, 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2105482118.

120
McBride, Marissa F., Fiona Fidler and Mark A. Burgman. 2012. “Evaluating the Accuracy and
Calibration of Expert Predictions under Uncertainty: Predicting the Outcomes of
Ecological Research”. Diversity and Distributions, 18, no. 7/8: 782-794. JSTOR, Liberty
University.
McDonald, John F., and Houston H. Stokes. 2013. “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble.”
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 46 no. 3: 1-15. Accessed July 1,
2021. Research Gate, Liberty University.
McPherson, Michael S., and Morton Owen Schapiro. 2006. “US Higher Education Finance.”
Handbook of the Economics of Education 2, 1403–34. Elsevier, Liberty University.
Mises, Ludwig von. 1951. Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. Translation by J.
Kahane. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kindle.
Moen, Jon. n.d. “John Law and the Mississippi Bubble: 1718-1720.” ms.gov. Accessed July 2,
2021. http://www.mshistorynow.mdah.ms.gov/articles/70/john-law-and-the-mississippibubble-1718-1720.
Morrisey, Michael. 2014. Health Insurance. Chicago: Health Administration Press. Second
Edition.
Moseley, George B. 2008. “The U.S. Health Care Non-System, 1908-2008.” AMA journal of
ethics. 10, no. 5: 324–331. Virtual Mentor, Liberty University.
Newport, Frank and Dugan, Andrew. 2017. “Partisan Differences Growing on a Number of
Issues.” Gallup.com. Accessed November 5, 2021.
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/215210/partisan-differences-growingnumber-issues.aspx.
Novak, Michael. 1982, 1991. The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism. Kindle ed. Lanham: Madison
Books.
Okes, Duke. 2003. “Complexity Theory Simplifies Choice.” Quality Progress, 36 no. 7:35.
ProQuest, Liberty University.
Office of Management and Budget Staff. 1967-2020. Economic and Budget Analysis. Accessed
August 12, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/.
Orrell, David and Patrick McSharry. 2009. “System Economics: Overcoming the Pitfalls of
Forecasting Models via a Multidisciplinary Approach”. International Journal of
Forecasting. 25, no. 4: 734-743. Science Direct, Liberty University.
Pascale, Richard; Milleman, Mark; Gioja, Linda. 2000. Surfing the Edge of Chaos. Crown.
Kindle Edition.
Pollard, S. 1953. “John Law and the Mississippi Bubble”. History Today, 3 no. 9: 622-629.
ProQuest, Liberty University

121
Quinn, William, and John D. Turner. 2020. Boom and Bust. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Kindle.
________. 2020. “Bubbles in History”. Business History, DOI:
10.1080/00076791.2020.1844668.
Richardson, Barbara C. 1979. Limitations on the Use of Mathematical Models in Transportation
Policy Analysis. University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. 2020. The Geography of Transport Systems. 5th ed. New York: Routledge.
Accessed July 1, 2021. https://transportgeography.org/contents/chapter3/transportationand-economic-development/bubble-stages/.
Rothbard, Murray N. 2009. Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market: The Scholar's
Edition. Second Edition. Auburn AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Kindle.
Sandefur, Timothy. "State 'Competitor's Veto' Laws and the Right to Earn a Living: Some Paths
to Federal Reform." Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. 38.3 (2015):
1042+. Business Insights: Global. Web. 18 Nov. 2021.
Scheinkman, José A., and Wei Xiong. 2003. “Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles”.
Journal of Political Economy, 111, no. 6: 1183-1220. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Schwartz, Anna J. 2009. “Origins of the Financial Market Crisis of 2008”. Cato Journal, 29, no.
1: 19–23. https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/catojournal/2009/1/cj29n1-2.pdf.
Senate.gov. 2015. “An Economic History of Federal Spending & Debt,” September 10, 2015.
Accessed November 7, 2019. https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/c90da849986a-41d3-ab20-77f38a393d85/20150910-jec-spendingstudy.pdf.
Senge, Peter. 2020. ”Commentary: Why Practicing a System’s Perspective Is Easier Said than
Done”. Applied Developmental Science, 24(1), 57-61. Accessed July 1, 2021.
https://www-tandfonlinecom.ezproxy.liberty.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10888691.2017.1421429
———, Peter M. 2006. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization.
New York: Doubleday/Currency.
Siegenfeld, Alexander F., Taleb, Nassim N. and Bar-Yam, Yaneer. 2020. “What Models Can and
Cannot Tell Us about COVID-19”. PNAS, 117, no. 28. Accessed December 1, 2021.
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2011542117.
Simon, Caroline. 2017. “Bureaucrats and Buildings: The Case for Why College Is So
Expensive.” Forbes.com. Accessed January 19, 2022.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinesimon/2017/09/05/bureaucrats-and-buildings-thecase-for-why-college-is-so-expensive/#2e2eed46456a.

122
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Kindle.
Sterman, John D. “All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a Systems Scientist”. Jay
Wright Forrester Prize Lecture, System Dynamics Review, 18, no. 4: 501–531. Wiley
Online, Liberty University.
Sternberg, Elaine. 2015. “Defining Capitalism”. Economic Affairs, 35, no. 3: 380-396. Wiley
Online, Liberty University.
Stockman, David A. 2013. The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America.
New York: PublicAffairs. Kindle.
Tabarrok, Alex. 2019. “Physician and Nurse Incomes Have Increased Tremendously”.
Marginalrevolution.com. Accessed August 1, 2021.
https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/05/physician-and-nurseincomes-have-increased-tremendously.html
Tacchella, A., D. Mazzilli, and L. Pietronero. 2018. “A Dynamical Systems Approach to Gross
Domestic Product Forecasting.” Nature Physics, 14: 861-865. DOI/10.1038/s41567-0180204-y.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2010. The Black Swan. New York: Random House. Kindle
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2007. “Black Swans and the Domains of Statistics.” The American
Statistician 61, no. 3: 198-200. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2020. “On the Statistical Differences between Binary Forecasts and
Real-world Payoffs.” International Journal of Forecasting, 36: 1228-1240. Elsevier,
Liberty University.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas and George A. Martin.2012. “How to Prevent Other Financial Crises.”
SAIS Review of International Affairs, 32, no. 1: 49-60. MUSE Liberty University.
Teicholz, Nina. 2015. “The Scientific Report Guiding the US Dietary Guidelines: Is It
Scientific?” British Medical Journal (Online), 351: 1-6. ProQuest, Liberty University.
Temin, Peter, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2004. “Riding the South Sea Bubble”. The American
Economic Review, 94, no. 4: 1654-1668. JSTOR, Liberty University.
Tepper, Jonathan and Hearn, Denise. 2019. The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death
of Competition. Hoboken: Wiley. Kindle.
Tetlock, Philip E. 2005. Expert Political Judgment. Princeton University Press. Kindle.
Thorton, Mark. 2004. “Who Predicted the Bubble? Who Predicted the Crash?”. The Independent
Review, 9 no. 1: 5-30. JSTOR, Liberty University.

123
“Total Grant Aid by Source over Time”. CollegeBoard.org. n.d. Accessed January 19, 2022.
https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid/figures-tables/total-grant-aid-type-over-time.
Tulip, Peter. 2008. “Has the Economy Become More Predictable? Changes in Greenbook
Forecast Accuracy.” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 41, no. 6: 1217-1231.
JSTOR, Liberty University.
Vijayan, Jaikumar. "NEEDED: Better IT Crystal Balls on Wall Street." Computerworld 42, no.
42: 8-10, ProQuest, Liberty University.
Vogel, Harold L. 2010. Financial Market Bubbles and Crashes. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Kindle Edition.
Wheeler, Bert. 2015. “Constrained / Unconstrained: Human Nature and Political Economy.”
Cedarville University: Bereans at the Gate, Sep 11, 2015. Accessed July 2, 2021.
https://bereansatthegate.com/constrained-unconstrained-human-nature-and-politicaleconomy/.
Williams, Walter E. 2008. Liberty Versus the Tyranny of Socialism: Controversial Essays.
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Kindle.

